68
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
removed from it.
29
30
Aaron Miller even cited Terje Larsen, the
Norwegian peace intermediary, who personally heard Barak
state: "I will do the opposite of Oslo".
31
At this point, Barak
preferred that the US revisit its role as facilitator, exactly as in
the first stage of the process in 1992-1996. Despite coming
to power without past statesmanship or political experience,
the force of Barak's personality successfully drew in others
around him, both in the Israeli "peace camp" and in the US
(particularly the US president), and he tried to simultaneously
juggle the management of three central issues: the Syrians,
the Palestinians, and the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon.
Barak met with regional leaders on July 11; Arafat, also in
attendance, expected that he would immediately begin
implementing the key articles of theWye agreement, (including
retreat from all area C). As mentioned, this was also Arafat's
approach during Netanyahu's premiership (as well as not
rushing to sign a permanent agreement on "Israeli" terms).
Arafat insisted that the Israeli government, under Barak's
leadership, would fulfil all its obligations as agreed on during
Netanyahu's administration – all articles of the Hebron
Agreement, as well as the second and third parts of the Wye
Memorandum. Moreover, in Barak's meeting with Mubarak,
the Egyptian president emphasized that the Palestinians saw
the Wye agreement as an important achievement that would
be difficult to relinquish. In contrast, Barak insisted they first
reach an agreement on principles, and only later discuss the
details, as without basic accord it would be difficult to reach
a comprehensive permanent agreement.
32
Barak continued attempts on three fronts: establishing peace
with the Syrians (giving the issue great weight), progressing
towards some framework agreement with the Palestinians,
and finally implementing the next phase of withdrawal on
the condition of signing a permanent agreement.
33
Early in
the process, President Clinton made it clear to Barak that
veering in any way from the agreement would pose a major
problem, and may – from Arafat's viewpoint – become the
true test of Barak's intentions.
In the Erez Crossing meeting, Barak and Arafat’s' second
meeting on July 27, Barak again proposed an outline that
included several central points, the most prominent being
immediate implementation of the second phase of withdrawal,
and postponement of the third phase until after an agreement
signing. Meanwhile, Barak suggested they begin negotiations
(between Gilead Sher and Saeb Erekat) on implementation
of the Wye agreement, and proposed an Israeli retreat from
territories in the Judea Desert, to be defined as nature
reserves so Palestinian construction in these areas would
be restricted, instead of the release of Palestinian prisoners
by Israel. The key and most significant point was
Barak's
29 Ibid., p. 75.
30 Interview with Yair Hirschfeld, June 23, 2016.
31 Miller, ibid, p. 283.
32 Beilin, ibid, p. 77.
33 Ibid.
demand (of Arafat) that he provide his final answer to
the proposal within two weeks
.
Arafat, probably on Clinton's advice, did not dismiss the
proposal, but did stall in providing a reply. During August of
1999, the parties continued to discuss the second withdrawal
phase and release of prisoners, including the number and
type of prisoners to be set free (the names of several criminal
prisoners also made it onto the list). Eventually, and after
many pitfalls, Arafat did finally agree to an outlined solution,
including implementation of theWye agreement by September
of that year. Secretary Albright expressed her willingness to
personally visit the region, but as was his policy at the time,
Barak preferred that she stay away. The core argument
centered on Barak's demand for an interim agreement prior to
signing a permanent one. The Palestinians claimed that was
not part of the Oslo Accords, but the Americans and Egyptians
pressured them to agree to this new Israeli condition.
34
On September 4, 1999 the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum
was signed in an attempt to finally implement previous
agreements, with both parties attending in good spirits and
successfully negotiating terms to the satisfaction of all. It was
later voted and approved of in the Israeli government and
Knesset. But it was particularly the Knesset vote that revealed
a point that would later prove significant – the strength of
the coalition. Several MKs did not attend the vote (such as
Shas members), while others openly opposed it (National
Religious Party and Yisrael BaAliyah). In addition, there were
five United Torah Judaism faction members who had already
left the coalition in protest against the transport of an electric
company turbine on the Sabbath, after Barak (for his own
reasons) refused to provide parking stops for the turbine to
avoid the controversy entirely. It was in this atmosphere that
Barak gradually lost his political base for significant, even
historic, political decisions.
Towards the end of 1999, the Syrian issue again became
national news, and on December 8 of that year President
Clinton announced an imminent meeting between PM Barak
and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. The meeting revealed
the profound disagreements between the parties, but also
clarified to the Americans that Barak was willing to retreat
from the June 4, 1967 border. For Barak, any breakthrough
with the Syrians was in accord with the policy previously
established by Rabin, a policy that had been abandoned
throughout 1995-1996. He also saw it as a move that could
pave the way for a retreat from Lebanon, as promised by
Barak during the election campaign. The Americans and
Palestinians interpreted this as a freezing of the progress
on the Palestinian peace,
35
and it seemed that the process
was again stalled. However, President Clinton and Secretary
Albright were unwilling (or incapable) of dealing with the
pressure Barak applied to the matter. On his part, Arafat felt
that Barak was "taking him for granted".
36
It is interesting to note
that several of Arafat's people did understand the benefit of
34 Ibid., p. 80.
35 Miller, ibid, p. 288.
36 Ibid., p. 289.
