71
understood that the very heart of the conflict centered on
the city and its holy sites.
Further in the negotiations, after his return from a brief trip to
Japan, Clinton raised three alternative solutions (deferring
discussion on certain issues), and asked Erekat to provide
Arafat's reaction to the proposals, but Arafat chose not to
make any. The American team felt Arafat was being stubborn,
and rigidly unwilling to make any compromises.
The Camp David Summit ended in failure, with several
possible causes:
• Both parties did not prepare sufficiently prior to arriving
at Camp David, particularly during the Stockholm talks.
Ehud Barak was overly confident, assuming that a meeting
between leaders (mediated by the US) would invariably
succeed, so that he and Arafat would manage to bridge
the differences and arrive at historic decisions.
• Israeli definitions –what the true "core" interests at play were
(as described by Shlomo Ben-Ami), when the Palestinians
refused to make any suggestions that could be addressed.
• The lack of any "Oslo people" during the Camp David
talks, meaning those best experienced at dealing with
the Palestinians, both in terms of managing negotiations
and familiarity with Palestinian negotiators.
• The personal relations between Barak and Arafat, and
the Palestinian leader's total lack of responsiveness to
Barak's manner and approach (most notably, the "dictation"
of schedules for making historic decisions).
• Barak's political weakness and loss of political and
public support, a fact that influenced his behavior during
negotiations. This weakness also stemmed from his own
personal manner and insensitivities to the fundamentals
of the political system.
On the other hand,
• Arafat's lack of commitment to any positions stated by
his subordinates, or any understandings achieved in the
early stages (particularly the Stockholm talks).
• Arafat's single-mindedness on core Palestinian issues
(Jerusalem, refugees), and total disregard for the Jewish
people's historical attachment to Jerusalem and the
Temple Mount.
• Disputes and disagreements in the Palestinian camp,
some personal in nature. This resulted in the exclusion
of the Palestinian Oslo negotiators from Camp David (a
division that also influenced Abu Alaa's ability to function
in Stockholm).
• The personal manner and conduct of Yasser Arafat,
including his behavior towards President Clinton, constantly
stalling for time and often refusing to respond to proposals.
• Arafat's flat refusal to stop the violence, or make the
slightest effort to calm down the riots in the territories, a
fact that increasingly undermined Barak's political and
public base and legitimacy in making concessions.
• Palestinian "narcissism" – meaning tenaciously refusing to
see reality through anything but a Palestinian perspective,
ignoring political reality (coalition and public) within
Israel. A lack of understanding or desire to understand
that Barak's weakness, certainly in view of the violence
and deteriorating state of security, made it difficult for him
to manage negotiations or make concessions, possibly
losing him his premiership and further distancing the
Palestinians from their grand aspirations. Their approach
always centered on "us" in the "here and now".
As for the Americans, Ron Malley, previously a National
Security Council member and Clinton's advisor on the Middle
East at the time, later pointed to the mistakes of the US during
proceedings.
50
Malley believes the US was unprepared for
the summit, and therefore constantly forced to improvise.
Moreover, the US underestimated the importance of dynamics
during the interim period – expansion of Israeli settlements
on one hand and incitement against Israel on the Palestinian
side on the other hand – as there was the hope that everything
would "fall into place" when peace was finally established.
Malley claims the Americans were too slow to make their
own suggestions, and when they did it was often too late.
After Camp David, there were continued attempts at contacts
on various levels, all with US involvement, but with no significant
breakthroughs. The reverse was true – the Second Intifada
immediately following Arik Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount
created a new situation entirely.
The Taba meetings were last-ditch efforts to make some
headway. These included the president's proposal ("Clinton
Parameters"), designed to conclude the conflict while
addressing four major points: the territories, the settlement
blocks, Jerusalem and the refugees – a list that included the
core issues. The Israeli government accepted the parameters
with amajority vote, even going so far as to compromise several
key positions, basically agreeing to a retreat from nearly 95%
of the West Bank, and unprecedented concessions regarding
sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Arafat responded with
evasive answers that even the Americans considered a
clear refusal.
By January of 2001, President Clinton had only a handful
of days before the end of his term, with elections in Israel
set for February 6, 2001. Could historic decisions of such
magnitude be reached in such a brief timespan? It seems
both parties were either incapable or unwilling to do so, each
for their own reasons.
Sharon and Olmert governments (2005-2009)
The following years were marked by a considerable number
of historic events in the region and the world. In the US,
President George Bush's administration began its term,
then the September 11 attacks resulted in the US invasion to
Afghanistan and Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein's
regime – two events that embroiled the region and the world
50 Beilin, ibid, p. 260.
