65
On September 23, 1996 (the eve of Yom Kippur), PM
Netanyahu decided to authorize the digging of a new exit
at the Western Wall Tunnels leading to the Muslim Quarter
and the Old City. The need for this tunnel exit had already
been discussed during Rabin's term, as movement in both
directions in the tunnels was difficult, but the intent was to
come to some kind of agreement, primarily with the Jordanian
Waqf (who had its own reasons for not desiring the PA's
interference in matters of the Temple Mount).
The opening of the tunnel sparked three whole days of riots
across the West Bank and Gaza (and to a smaller extend
among Israeli Arabs), in which 17 IDF soldiers and 100
Palestinians were killed, and many more wounded. After the
riots, President Clinton summoned Netanyahu and Arafat to
Washington to a summit meeting (with King Hussein also
attending), putting a stop to the violence and initiating the
signing of the Hebron Agreement on January 15, 1997,
dividing the city of Hebron to areas H1 and H2. Two paradoxes
produced this turn of events:
• This agreement constituting the next step of a stage Shimon
Peres left incomplete, during the period between Rabin's
assassination and forming of the Benjamin Netanyahu
government.
• Under Netanyahu's premiership, the US could intervene
in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians far
more than during the Rabin (and Peres) administrations.
Netanyahu, having previously declared on the eve of the
elections that he would not renounce the Oslo Accords,
despite being known for his opposition to them (as was
unquestionably the right-wing and Haredi coalition that
formed his powerbase), decided to leave all options open
15
.
He signaled his intentions to President Mubarak of Egypt
and King Hussein of Jordan, albeit at this point still indirectly,
and communicated with Abu Mazen through his advisor,
Dore Gold. Yet, Netanyahu's personal conduct with the
Palestinians remained unchanged, as he insistently refused
to meet with Arafat, and his government refused to take any
steps to improve the dire economic conditions in Gaza and
the West Bank. It took combined American and European
pressure to compel Netanyahu to allow the meeting between
Foreign Affairs Minister David Levy and Abu Mazen, where
they discussed the establishment of new work relations
between Israel and the PA, including several understandings
regarding Jerusalem. A short time later, Dore Gold again met
with Abu Mazen, revoking these agreements and demanding
the Palestinians take trust-building measures, closing political
establishments in East Jerusalem
16
. Despite all these
developments, the Hebron Agreement was signed on May 15,
1997, and ratified the following day by a majority of the Knesset
(thanks to the support of the Labor Party and the political left).
The Hebron Agreement was certainly not approved of by
the Likud (Netanyahu's own party), or by right-wing coalition
15 "Oslo: A Formula for Peace; from Negotiations to Implementation",
by Yair Hirschfeld, 2000 (p. 244).
16 Ibid., p. 245.
members, and in order to create "balances", Netanyahu
decided to authorize the construction in Har Homa (although
it must be mentioned that the Labor Party also supported
building in this area). Naturally, this decision instigated a
difficult crisis with the Palestinians. Throughout, the date of
March 7, 1997 was fast approaching – the day on which, per
the Oslo Accords, the first stage of redeployment of Israeli
military forces in the West Bank was planned.
Several people close to Netanyahu – including Gold and
Molcho – tried to establish secret channels to contact Arafat,
attempting tomake him "sympathize" with Netanyahu regarding
Har Homa, meaning his intent to placate the right-wing
parties, including his own party members. At the same
time, they discussed with Arafat appropriate compensation
to the Palestinians, and began a consultation process, thus
establishing a dynamic of negotiations.
17
Arafat had his own reasons to refuse the challenge, and at
this point the renewal of the conflict was already in the offing.
On the one side was Netanyahu, with his personal ideology
and constant pressure from the political and ideological
right, rebuffing any negotiations or concessions regarding
the Land of Israel, and on the other was Yasser Arafat,
who mistrusted Netanyahu and had to deal with his own
pressure from the Hamas. The situation allowed each leader to
"assist" his counterpart to become further entrench in his own
camp. Despite this, several senior members of Netanyahu's
government, people who did support continuing the Oslo
process, met with Palestinian senior officials, such as Defense
Minister Yitzhak Mordechai's meeting with Yasser Abed Rabbo,
and Foreign Affairs Minister David Levy's meeting with Abu
Mazen, but these meetings only worsened tensions within
the various factions of Israel's government.
18
The difficulties and dilemmas Netanyahu was forced to
tackle prompted him to attempt to detour around the interim
phase and work towards a permanent agreement. Indeed,
he offered opening months-long negotiations, hinting at his
willingness to a Palestinian state spanning 45-50% of West
Bank territories, and even the evacuation of several Jewish
settlements. Netanyahu affirmed his intentions in a meeting
attended by representatives of the press, held in the Sokolov
House on November 27, 1997. He did emphasize throughout
the unbending condition for such concessions was that
the PA take action against the terrorist attacks.
19
On their
part, the Palestinians rejected the suggestion of "skipping"
the interim stage, demanding negotiations on the three-
phase Israeli withdrawal and redeployment as determined
in Oslo II. Despite this, communication was maintained and
talks continued regarding a permanent arrangement between
Netanyahu's people - Yitzhak Molcho and Ariel Sharon
(Minister of National Infrastructure), and Abu Alaa and Abu
Mazen. From Netanyahu's point of view, any kind of response
from the Palestinians would have been beneficial. If they
agreed to negotiations, he would gain support from some
17 Ibid., p. 249.
18 Ibid.
19 Golan, Avirama. Haaretz newspaper, November 28, 1997.
