69
progress between Israel and Syria, as it would reduce some
of the pressure put on the PA and Arafat by Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad which were supported by Syria.
37
Negotiations with the Syrians, including the meeting in
Shepherdstown, produced not a single achievement, and
were ultimately an unmitigated failure. The central (although
certainly not single) point was the Syrians' access to the Sea
of Galilee, with Barak greatly influenced by public opinion
in Israel, which was markedly more reserved in regards to
Syria than it was to resolving the Palestinian issue. This is
evident in the gaps measured during the '90s between the
Oslo Peace Index and Syria Peace Index.
InAaronMiller's view, this rush towardspeacewithSyria revealed
three problems to resolving the conflict with the Palestinians:
• A long period, approximately six months, had already
been wasted, and there were only eight months left to
President Clinton's term.
• A great deal of distrust had been generated among the
Palestinians, particularly Arafat, towards Barak and his
intentions. Among other things, this stemmed from his
refusal to fulfil promises planned for execution during the
interim period, most specifically the transfer of the three
Palestinian villages near Jerusalem: Sawahara, Abu Dis,
and Al-Azariya.
• Hafez al-Assad's refusal to make concessions, and his
insistence on a return to the June 4, 1967 lines, setting the
bar particularly high for Arafat and making it very difficult
for him to take a different stance throughout negotiations
on the West Bank agreement.
Another difficulty impeding negotiations, primarily on the
Palestinian side, was that Arafat had arrived at this pivotal point
when Abu Mazen and Abu Alaa, the two men closest to him
(at least since the Oslo process), were not by his side. This
became apparent in Wye as parties discussed the issue of
the prisoner release, when no clear distinction made between
security prisoners (viewed by the Palestinians as freedom
fighters), and criminal prisoners incarcerated in Israel. This
fact was utilized by the Israeli government (under Netanyahu)
to release many criminal offenders, thus including them in
the overall count, a situation that caused a rift between Abu
Mazen and several of his close aides, including Mohammad
Dahlan and Azfar Hassan. The issue of security prisoners
was a sensitive and central factor to the Palestinian public,
as it has direct impact on many families in the West Bank
and Gaza. One example of how deeply felt this issue was
were the violent riots that broke out in Ramallah, near Abu
Mazen's house, probably "prompted" by Dahlan.
38
On the Israeli side, the "hardcore" peace supporters, those who
had witnessed the birth of the Oslo process,
39
were pushed
out of the process right until the Camp David Summit. This
was a logical step to take on Barak's part, as he wanted to
37 Ibid.
38 Interview with Yair Hirschfeld.
39 Interview with Yair Hirschfeld.
manage the process very differently from past experiences
in Oslo, but it was also a political misstep, possibly a crucial
one, as he sacrificed the benefit these capable, creative, and
experienced people may have lent to the process.
40
In the second week of May 2000, in reaction to Israel
postponing the release of security prisoners, Palestinian
prisoners in all Israeli prisons initiated a mass hunger strike.
This event carried severe repercussions on the Palestinian
political system and Palestinian public opinion. Increasing
tensions finally erupted on "Nakba Day" (May 14), with violence
spilling over to the following day and intensifying to hostile
clashes between IDF soldiers and Palestinian protestors,
including several Tanzimmilitants. Palestinian police reacting
passively to unfolding events. Five Palestinians were killed, and
almost 200 injured. Twelve IDF soldiers were also wounded.
That day, Barak's proposal to transfer responsibility of Abu
Dis to the Palestinians was approved by the Knesset (moving
it from area B to area A). The majority vote was unimpressive
(56:48), with coalitionmembers fromShas and Yisrael Baaliyah
("Israel on the Rise") parties and their deputy ministers not
in attendance, and members of their factions voting against
the transfer. This posed another element in the coalition
breakdown, and in Prime Minister Barak's loss of his political
base and legitimacy among the public.
On May 11, 2000, the Stockholm talks began against this
backdrop of disquiet and violence in the areas of the Nakba
Day and the "Days of Rage" (termed such by Palestinian
leadership to recruit Palestinian public opinion by inciting
political riots and providing an outlet for its fury). The talks
were meant to lay the groundwork for a framework agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians. Although planned to
be held in secret, news leaked and they became public – a
fact that created problems for the negotiators and leaders
of both sides with their political rivals.
Throughout the talks, the Palestinians were offered 66% of
the West Bank, with the remaining area divided into three
settlement blocks: Gush Etzion, Ariel, and the Jerusalem
"envelope". Jerusalem, specifically its holy sites and the future
capital of the Palestinian state, was not discussed, primarily
due to Barak's concern that it would further weaken his
coalition (already showing signs of deterioration). Professor
Shlomo Ben-Ami, acting Foreign Minister at the time, believes
this may have been a mistake, as discussions regarding
Jerusalem may have helped them prepare better for the
Camp David Summit.
41
The Palestinians, particularly Abu Alaa, refused to review the
map, but did discuss percentages of land area.
In the end, the Stockholm talks produced no accords or even
agreements. Whatever possible outcomes can be attributed
to these talks, centers principally on matters of security, the
settlement blocks, and the refugees. However, understandings
left undocumented and unsigned are always "in the eye of the
40 "A Front without a Rearguard", by Shlomo Ben Ami, Miskal – Yediot
Aharonoth and Chemed Books, 2004. (p. 41)
41 Interview with Ari Shavit, March 142001
ת
, Haaretz newspaper.
