78
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
3. The segment of the
Israeli religious public
that believes
the sanctity of the Holy Land supersedes any State
decision flatly refuses to consider any concessions of
ancestral lands.
4. The great public of
Jewish settlers
are not a single unit,
and while some may agree to compromise, most would
do so only after a democratic decision on the matter.
5. Jerusalem is important to the
entire Jewish public
, as it
relates to the Jewish people's historical link to the Temple
Mount (regardless of any state-made agreement). As for
those of the
religious public who believe in "Greater
Israel"
– Jerusalem is and will always remain Jewish.
6. The current Israeli government gives great weight to the
regional players of the Middle East
– Egypt, Jordan,
and also Saudi Arabia (in relation to security, political,
and even economic matters).
7. The
Palestinians
are apparently currently incapable of
moving forward in the negotiations, and this probably will
remain so in the near future. They hold to a dual policy
– expressing understanding for the terrorist attacks due
to internal constraints, while also meticulously continuing
security cooperation with Israel.
8. It is doubtful the Arab states (including Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia) consider the
Palestinian cause in and of
itself
at the top of their list of priorities.
9.
Egypt
shares several national and security interests
with Israel: the Gaza Strip (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and
dissident organizations), and the Sinai Peninsula (ISIS,
Al-Qaeda). There is also a shared economic interest
(gas). Egypt also has its
own reasons for wanting to
keep the Palestinian issue and the matter of Jerusalem
quiet
. The
Muslim Brotherhood
remain insistent in their
attitude regarding Al-Aqsa, and their hostile attitude to
Israel, and Egyptian public opinion is hostile to Israel,
and its attitude regarding the Palestinians and Al-Aqsa
is legendary.
These two factors put pressure on the
Egyptian political system
.
10.
Jordan
shares national, security, and economic interests
with Israel, yet is also aware of the enormous sensitivity of
the Palestinian cause and the holy sites due to pressure
from the "Islamic Block", Jordanian public opinion, and
the Palestinians. Notably, Jordan has a personal stake
in the issue of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa.
11.
Saudi Arabia
– has strategic and security interest relevant
to two issues: ISIS and Iran.
12.
The international community
is very interested in
resolving the Palestinian problem, or at minimum calm
the atmosphere enough to renew the diplomatic process.
Concluding Chapter: What is Necessary to
Overcome theDevastatingEffect of Spoilers?
It is evident that terror and other spoiler action cannot
be overcome merely by military action. Nevertheless,
understanding security in its wider concept may help to
identify necessary action and understand, where Israel can
(and must) act alone, and where outside support is needed.
A comprehensive security approach needs to be based and
developed by seeking optimal results to seven different but
complementary criteria and understandings:
I. Achieving internal societal cohesion;
II. Obtaining optimal military capacities;
III. Being fully aware of moral obligations and the limits of
power and military action;
IV. The need to obtain support from allies in the region and
beyond;
V. The necessity to stop or minimize violence by signing
agreements;
VI. The need to take care of essential interests and the well-
being of the Palestinian people, and last but not least
VII.Understanding that the status quo is not sustainable and
a policy of mere crisis management; without a strategy
showing the way ahead, the conflict will get worse.
My working assumption is that – if these six criteria are taken
care off, each one in an optimal manner – it will be possible to
minimize, not necessarily to eliminate, spoiler action. Based
on these criteria, it is possible to define tasks for action of all
relevant stakeholders:
1. Israel
a.
Achieving Internal Social Cohesion
Most obviously, it is the task of the Israeli Government and
civil society, to seek to achieve social cohesion and minimize
emotional, religious-cultural, and political stumbling blocks.
Superficially seen this would mean to take action to limit
incitement of the Israeli radical right against the peace camp,
while Israel’s supporters of a two-state solution would have
to be seen to refrain from seeking to impose substantial
settlement evacuation on the settler community. However,
in enabling a two-state solution, the issue is more complex
and relates to the entire conceptual approach that has to be
adopted. Israel’s Center and the Peace Camp tend to support
the call for a two-state solution, by seeking to implement the
slogan: “We (Israelis) are here, and they (the Palestinians) are
there”; supporters of Israel’s right wing and settlers perceive
this call as turning them into “outcasts”.
As the majority of Israelis, including Israel’s present Prime
Minister, verbally and conceptually are committed to achieve
a two-state solution, the task of the political leadership is
to define an Israeli concept, how to achieve this goal, and
gradually minimize fears and opposition. The task of civil
society is to reach out to each other. In this context, the moral
commitment of Israel, not to subdue the Palestinian people,
and the religious understanding of Israel’s right wing, that God
has not merely ordained to settle the Land of Eretz Yisrael,
but he has put the challenge to come to decent and moral
