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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
Two other discursive paradigms – "Land for Peace,"
and "Security Zone," relate to the 1967 territories as an
instrumental/pragmatic dilemma rather than an ethical/
ideological imperative. The two pragmatic paradigms are
primarily concerned with the circumstances rather than the
nature of the occupation – the balance of cost and benefit,
risk and opportunity, in a particular time-bound configuration
of politics and security. These are the discursive domains of
Israel's Centrist "silent majority"; the present configuration
has led them to tell pollsters consistently that the occupation
would be undesirable in ideal conditions, but appears the
least risky option in current circumstances. In the absence
of some exogenous shocks that reframe the issue, these are
the "swing states" on the Israeli political map – the discursive
realms that hold potential for change. It is important to note,
at the same time, that as instrumental cost/benefit prisms,
these can provide grounding for arguments in either direction.
From Camp David to Camp David: The Rise
and Fall of Land for Peace
"Land for Peace" is the classic transactional formula of the
Middle East peace process, applied successfully at the state
level between Egypt and Israel, if not yet on the Syrian and
Palestinian fronts. In this framing, the territories are framed
opportunistically as a "bargaining chip," an asset to be
held temporarily until they can be exchanged for "peace" –
meaning at least the permanent cessation of hostilities, and
ideally recognition, legitimation, normalization of relations
and integration of Israel the Middle East. This is the classic
language of the Israeli Labor Party, of US and international
mediators of the peace process, and since 2002 the Arab
League, as enshrined in the Arab Peace Initiative (API).
In the pre-Oslo years, the successful negotiation and
implementation of the 1979 Camp David Accords between
Israel and Egypt enabled "Land for Peace" to stand on firm
ground in terms of historical precedent. The return of the vast
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt via negotiated agreement vastly
improved Israel's strategic position, transforming its most
potent enemy into a security partner. Israel-Egypt relations
remained a "cold peace" between states, as Egyptian society
opposed popular normalization without a resolution to the
Palestinian issue – but for years, that reticence was plausibly
cast by the Israeli "peace camp" as further incentive to
negotiate an end to Israeli rule over the Palestinians. As David
Broza sang at the close of countless peace demonstrations,
"Just get out of the territories, and it will all be good..."
Tragically, the "Land for Peace" concept has since proven
necessary but not sufficient in the Palestinian case. In regards
to Egypt, Israel negotiated with one of the world's ancient
nations with functioning state institutions. On the Palestinian
front, Israel negotiates with a revolutionary movement, the
PLO, with which it is necessary to pursue a much more
complicated state-building process while cultivating relations
between the emerging State of Palestine, Israel and its other
neighbors.
Ehud Barak's July 2000 Camp David sequel summit produced
the first of multiple failures of the "nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed" approach to negotiations. These
repeated failures undermined the credibility that Camp David
I and the Oslo Agreements — in spite of their limitations —
had established. In the wake of Yasser Arafat's refusal to
accept Barak's proposal at Camp David, and later the Clinton
Parameters, two diametrically opposed narratives emerged
that widened the gap between Israelis and Palestinians. The
Israeli narrative, buoyed by President Clinton, indicated that
Barak had made a far-reaching proposal to reach a two-state
peace agreement with the Palestinians; Clinton described
Arafat’s position as “an error of historic proportions." In
the same vein Barak famously declared that, "We have
no Palestinian partner for peace," a sentiment echoed by
the President (Clinton, 2004). The Palestinian narrative, by
contrast, criticized Barak's conduct and asserted that he
offered too little, too late – criticisms acknowledged in part
by members of the American and Palestinian negotiation
team (Agha & Malley, 2001).
3
Matters were made far worse
by the eruption of the second intifada, when "no partner"
became a resurgent Right's antidote to international pressure
to cease settlement-building and pave the way for Palestinian
statehood.
The "no partner" meme has proven protean and durable,
outlasting Arafat and evolving over time. The original version
focused on Arafat's persona – his allegedly mendacious
character and inability tomake the transition from revolutionary
to statesman (Ross, 2005). After Arafat's death in 2004, "no
partner" became conversely associated with the purported
impotence of his moderate successor Mahmoud Abbas,
whom Ariel Sharon largely kept on the sidelines of Israel's
2005 "disengagement" from Gaza. Sharon at first permitted
his Vice Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to negotiate with the
Palestinians the orderly transfer of immovable infrastructure
to the Palestinian side. When the Palestinians rejected the
Israeli offer, the Israeli military withdrawal was successfully
coordinated with the Palestinian Security Forces. However,
Sharon refused to accept the PA leader's request for the IDF
to remain in the Gaza Strip temporarily after the evacuation
of all settlements, until the PA could establish law and order
(Hirschfeld 2014). Hamas obliged by inflicting humiliating
defeats on Abbas' Fatah party in 2006 parliamentary elections,
and in street battles during a hostile 2007 takeover of the
Gaza Strip – hardening ideological and territorial divisions
across a schizophrenic Palestinian policy, and adding another
theme to the meme.
3 It is important to note that the Camp David II negotiations did
lead to the publication of the Clinton Parameters, which provided
unprecedented detail to the “land for peace” component of the
process and proposed solutions for the Jerusalem and the refugee
question. This was done, however, in disrespect of Arafat’s suggestion
to adopt a phased process: first, recognize the State of Palestine,
while committing to negotiate outstanding core issues of conflict
during the following two years. (Hirschfeld 2014). Three years later,
in April 2003, the Quartet powers proposed the “Performance-Based
Roadmap” which by and large adopted the phased approach.
