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The "no partner" concept was reinforced by the next failure of
the “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” approach,
during the 2008 Olmert — Abbas negotiations (Hirschfeld
2014), and again by the post-2011 chaos engulfing the wider
region. At the same time, a toxic combination of Palestinian
"anti-normalization" pressures and Israeli-imposed movement
restrictions have made it increasingly difficult for Palestinian
peace activists to speak with Israeli audiences – creating a
parallel "constrained partner" effect at the civil society level
(Baskin, 2016).
At a deeper level, the trauma of the second intifada, the most
lethal escalation of direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict since
1948, drove a sharp shift in Israeli public opinion that has
only been reinforced by subsequent events (Bar Siman Tov,
2007). A decade after the wave of suicide bombings and
shooting attacks, existential fears and deep-seated distrust
of the Palestinians persist – the psychological counterpart
of the sprawling Separation Barrier – and block out any
positive overtures. Israeli Jews no longer believe that "peace"
is possible at present – a disillusionment mirrored on the
Palestinian side. Prominent international attempts to influence
the Israeli public through incentives, such as the API, the
Fayyad-era reform of the PA, or the EU offer of "special
privileged partnership," are not rejected so much as they are
invisible – broadcast on a "Land for Peace" frequency which
most Israeli Jews have long since tuned out (MITVIM, 2016).
Since the second intifada, security overrides opportunity on
Israeli perceptions of the Palestinian issue – although not
always in favor of continued occupation.
"Security Zone" Discourse: The Dilemma
of De-Occupation
The "Security Zone" discourse represents the pessimistic
side of the pragmatic coin – and in present conditions, the
most prominent. In this framing, the occupation is above
all a military question – whether control of the West Bank
enhances or harms Israel's security. Like "Land for Peace,"
the issue is viewed through an instrumental cost/benefit
prism, but one that emphasizes risk rather than opportunity.
Yuval Rahamim, current Chair of the Peace NGOs Forum,
explains the primacy of security in Israeli society as deeply
rooted in collective trauma, past and present:
"Although objectively Israel today enjoys a high level of
security, ironically Israelis share a collective experience of
constant threat. The narratives of the exile, the Holocaust,
anti-Semitism, wars, thousands of terrorist attacks and
enemies calling for the destruction of the State of Israel,
all maintain a mental state of victimhood, persecution and
fear of annihilation. Over the years, Israel’s basic need for
security became a core value, rather than the infrastructure
for realization of higher national and social aspirations"
(Rahamim, Peace-Obstructing Perceptions in Israeli Society,
2016).
In the decades following the Six-Day War, security discourse
was primarily invoked as a trump card by opponents of
"Land for Peace" on the Right. "Security hawks" of the Likud
classically described the West Bank – on helicopter tours
for visiting foreign dignitaries, for example – as providing
"strategic depth" at Israel's "narrow waist" to withstand
assaults from East of the Jordan River, such as occurred in
1948, 1967 and 1973 (BICOM , 2016).
The "security zone" framing was originally deployed to justify
the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Eventually,
however, the argument of peace activists, demanding
withdrawal from Lebanon, mainly in order to minimize
casualties, obtained the upper hand and brought about
the withdrawal in June 2000. The decision to withdraw from
Gaza and evacuate all settlements from there and further
five settlements from the Northern West Bank, was motivated
rather by political considerations (Hirschfeld 2014). In both
cases, mounting casualty tolls led security elites, and then
decisive majorities of the Israeli public, to view the IDF
presence beyond Israel's recognized borders as harming
rather than enhancing security. CSOs played prominent
roles in popularizing this framing, particularly a pair of
initiatives led by bereaved parents – Four Mothers and the
Parents Circle Families Forum (Levy, 2012). In both cases,
the Prime Ministers ordering withdrawal – Ehud Barak and
Ariel Sharon – were themselves former generals renowned
for leading military strikes in the past – as, of course, was
Yitzhak Rabin.
A genre of "security zone" discourse continues to be
effectively deployed by the Center-Left. A parade of retired,
and sometimes active, military leaders have been the
most prominent, and sometimes most effective, domestic
critics of Netanyahu's foreign policy agenda – publicly
opposing a military strike on Iran and warning against
inertia on the Palestinian front. As exemplified by CSOs like
Ami Ayalon's National Census, Aharon Yariv's Peace and
Security Association and the more recent Commanders
for Israel's Security, the classic general's career path of
"parachuting" from the IDF to the Knesset now may include
a phase of civil society advocacy. Indeed, according to
track-two experts who have worked with IDF leadership
in recent years, the prevailing wind in the senior officer
corps supports implementing confidence-building measures
aimed at empowerment of the PA security forces, economic
development and resuscitation of the negotiations.
Securitized discourse emphasizing the painful costs of
prolonged occupation is thus well-established in Israeli
civil society, and firmly associated with Gaza and Lebanon
withdrawals in popular consciousness. Tragically, the
aftermath of both cases has enabled opponents of Palestinian
statehood to focus on the costs of de-occupation – arming
themwith perhaps their most effective discursive ammunition
to date.
In 2000 and 2005, opponents of Gaza and Lebanon
occupations presented their arguments on an essentially
blank historical canvas. The only precedent for full evacuation
of soldiers and settlers was Israel's 1982 withdrawal from
the Sinai Peninsula, an area then synonymous with pleasant
