86
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
want to lose people on controversial issues. When you are
going macro, you go to the lowest common denominator...
Today at Civic Leadership, when I raise the persecution of
human rights organizations by the government, I lose a lot
of people." Finkel-Perl illustrates the point with reference
to the government's recent "transparency law" that singles
out organizations receiving a majority of their funds from
international governments, widely interpreted as designed to
de-legitimize peace and human rights CSOs: "Our executive
committee opposed this law, but on a professional level, not
political... But some CSOs said we shouldn't have gotten
involved, because the whole thing was a political football
– and Left organizations felt abandoned because we didn't
say this was political persecution".
Finkel-Perl ultimately lauds the work of "peace NGOs" – but
is acutely aware of their limited reach: "These are a few
organizations – they do work that has incredible value, they
are influential and important. They represent voices of a
group in Israeli society, with clarity, values – but it's a voice
that is shrinking... They don't represent the voice of civil
society in Israel." The question, then, is why. In her opinion,
the civil society peace advocacy community has yet to adapt
to profound shifts in Israel and the surrounding region: "We
live in a context – we can't send the same messages, and
expect that they will suddenly be received differently. The
narrative has changed inside Israeli society. And the Middle
East has changed too."
The Status Quo Option: Peace and the
Palestinians in Israeli Public Opinion
For veteran advocates of "two states for two peoples," recent
opinion research makes for sobering reading. In anticipation
of the upcoming 50th anniversary of the 1967 War, the
"Peace Index" polling series dedicated its June 2016 edition
to gauging opinion on the past, present and future of the
occupiedWest Bank. In the (expected) absence of any peace
agreement, themajority of Israeli Jewish respondents preferred
either annexation of the West Bank (32%) or continuing the
status quo (23%) over either an internationally imposed
solution (12%) or granting equal rights to the Palestinians
(19%). Even in the context of a peace agreement with the
Palestinians, 46% of Jews opposed withdrawal from the
settlements, versus 43% in support. Moreover, while 58%
of Jewish respondents expressed support for negotiations
with the Palestinians, only 20% expected these to result in
an actual agreement (Yaar & Hermann, 2016).
Shortly thereafter, the MITVIMRegional Foreign Policy Institute
published findings of a poll of Israeli attitudes toward the
relative importance of cooperation with four Arab states –
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia – and the Palestinian
Authority (PA). Overall rankings varied according to the political
affiliations of Israeli respondents, in regard to the Palestinians.
Supporters of all parties in the current governing coalition
made the PA a low priority, often last on their list. As Dr. Elie
Podeh explained, "the bad news... is that more than half
the public attaches little importance, if at all, to cooperation
with the Palestinian Authority," despite the fact that security
cooperation with the PA arguably has much greater direct
impact on the daily lives of Israelis than diplomatic relations
with neighboring states (MITVIM, 2016).
Both sets of findings echo trends observed by opinion
researcher and political strategist Dahlia Scheindlin, who
asserts that, "If you ask one state versus two states, [the
majority of Israeli Jews] will always choose two states" – a
sentiment recently confirmed to the tune of 60% versus 8%,
according to a June 2016 poll (Eldar 2016). "But if the choice
is the status quo versus withdrawal now," Scheindlin explains,
"my occasional tracking polling shows that roughly 60%, or
slightly more, will take the status quo option" (Scheindlin, 2016).
These sentiments seem to resonate perfectly with Netanyahu's
policy priorities – both his recent emphasis on contacts with
Sunni Arab states – possibly at the expense of the Palestinians,
and his trademark strategy of rebuffing international initiatives
on the peace process – what Natan Sachs has aptly labeled
"anti-solutionism" (Sachs, 2015). As Scheindlin explains, "For
over a decade, data shows that resolving the conflict is a
significantly lower priority than other major issues. Probing
Israelis on this leads me to the conclusion that [the majority]
don't think it can be [resolved], and they don't think it needs to
be, it's not worth the concessions. The leadership reinforces
that constantly." This despite years of dire warnings, from the
international community and the Israeli Left, that Palestinians
will soon constitute a majority of inhabitants between the
river and the sea, that the window for a two-state solution is
closing, and that Israel must act now to preserve its character
as a Jewish and democratic state.
An alternative interpretation is certainly possible. If Netanyahu
genuinely perceives a rapprochement with Sunni Arab states
to be a strategic security interest of the State of Israel, we can
imagine that Arab (Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi) insistence
on maintaining essential Palestinian national rights oblige
Netanyahu sooner or later to seek an understanding with
the support of the Arab states, and the Palestinians — as
recently argued by General Amidror in Netanyahu’s favorite
daily, Israel HaYom (Amidror 2016)
The difficulty is — as the June 2016 Peace Index suggests
– that much of the Israeli Jewish public lacks the basic
knowledge necessary in order to hold an informed opinion
on the issue. 52% of Jewish respondents did not know that
the term "Green Line" refers to the pre-1967 border; only
15% knew the correct answer with certitude. Crucially, 50%
significantly underestimated the Palestinian population of the
occupied West Bank, while 27% admitted they do not know
the answer; only 13% cited the correct estimate of 2-3 million
in the West Bank, and 1.8 million in the Gaza Strip, as well as
1.8 million Israeli Palestinians (Peace Index 2016). Hence, a
majority of the Jewish public lacks rudimentary information
necessary to comprehend the "demographic" argument that
is the primary interest-based rationale for urgent action on
the two-state solution.
