Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward a Peaceful Two-State Solution - page 95

93
must ask ourselves honestly, what is common to all these
population sectors? Do we have a shared civil language,
a shared ethos? Do we share a common denominator of
values with the power to link all these sectors together in
the Jewish and democratic State of Israel?"
The "music" was as important as the details. Stating that "we
are all here to stay," Rivlin invoked census data, yet critiqued
the use of "demographics" in the service of division and
exclusion; he used the framing of "tribes" to urge Israelis
to transcend tribalism. The speech concluded with a call
for cross-societal partnership based on pillars of dignity
and security and respect for identity, shared responsibility,
equity and equality. The speech inspired myriad responses
and has set the tone for much academic, civil society and
policy discussion since – as well as Rivlin's own subsequent
plan of action. The President has gone on to "walk the walk"
through public support for dialogue, condemnation of racist
rhetoric, and visits to victims of extremist violence such as
the Hand-in-Hand school in Jerusalem.
Dahlia Scheindlin credits Rivlin as being, "on the political
level, the only person who's succeeded in cutting through
the very binary thinking". That may be true in the Jewish
population – but Ayman Odeh, the leading parliamentary voice
of the country's Arab-Palestinian citizens, provides another
example of successful "big tent" leadership and dialogical
outreach across sectors. Ironically, Odeh indirectly owes his
prominence on the national stage to Israel's Arab-baiting
answer to Donald Trump, Avigdor Lieberman. During the
previous Knesset, Lieberman championed legislation that
raised the parliamentary vote threshold in a manner designed
to exclude the small Arab parties that traditionally competed
over a fraction of the total voting public. In response, the four
leading Arab factions put aside their profound ideological
differences – the sort that are matters of life and death in
neighboring Syria – and united to form the Joint List, with
a common platform emphasizing the shared struggle for
civic equality and cultural autonomy, and against racism
and discrimination.
Despite having never served a term in the Knesset, Odeh was
elected chair of the new bloc and handed what appeared
to many a mission impossible – uniting his own radical Left
Hadash faction, Israel's Communist Party, with its traditional
electoral competition – militant Arab nationalist and moderate
Islamic factions. Odeh rose to the occasion and led a widely
praised 2015 election campaign, increasing voter turnout,
securing 13 seats and garnering accolades from the Israeli
and international press for his skillful engagement with
the mainstream public (Remnick, 2016). In one televised
debate, Odeh famously got the better of Lieberman himself
– remaining resolutely composed, substantive and sharp
through the latter's attempts at bigoted name-calling
and provocation. Odeh's open approach to Israeli Jews
presents an equally sharp contrast with the hostile affect
of his nationalist coalition partners from Balad, who Odeh
has criticized for inflaming tensions rather than building
coalitions for change. He has, by all accounts, walked this
political tightrope adeptly, maintaining sufficient factional
unity while advancing Israel's largest-ever governmental
investment of resources in the development of the Arab
sector, during the most Right-wing administration in Israel's
history (Gerlitz, 2016).
In analyzing Odeh's leadership, it is crucial to credit the civil
society process that built the platform on which he stands.
A decade before the emergence of the Joint List, a broad
spectrum of the Arab civil society and political leadership in
Israel convened an extended series of dialogues and drafting
sessions culminating in the publication of joint statements
known as the "Future Vision Documents" (Jamal, 2008). These
documents articulated, for the first time, a shared narrative
and a set of common principles and aspirations for the
Palestinian minority in Israel. These triggered widespread
responses in Israeli civil and political society – putting the
collective identity and political perspectives of Israel's
Arab-Palestinian citizens on the map in an unprecedented
manner. The process of drafting the documents illuminated
the common denominators that have served to unite the Joint
List across factional differences, while the debates sparked
by their publication, in many ways, prepared elements in the
elite Jewish public to hear the nuance in Odeh's voice and
understand the communal basis of his demands.
Neither of these two individuals are prominent advocates
of the two-state solution; Rivlin was a longtime opponent
before recently advocating a two-state federation (Haaretz,
2015). Yet two-state advocates can draw inspiration from
their communication strategies and their inclusive discourse,
in seeking to spark broad and deep public conversations
regarding the occupation.
Conclusion
Under the headline of
Heshbon Nefesh
, leaders of the
"peace camp" can use the 50th anniversary to engage in
a "Future Vision" process of our own – to rebuild our own
community, to assess our purpose and strategy, and above
all to effectively engage the skeptical Center and broader
society in the discussion. Key elements of such a process
must include:
1)
Security
: The recent "two-state security" reports can serve
as platforms for communal
Heshbon Nefesh
regarding the
security dimensions of de-occupation. Such a discussion
should train civil society peace advocates in understanding
and clearly acknowledging the legacy of the second intifada,
the wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, and the civil conflicts
raging throughout the region. Any effective engagement
with the wider Israeli public depends on legitimizing and
effectively addressing genuine and well-grounded security
concerns regarding the security implications of de-occupation
in the West Bank.
In particular, we must effectively address the potential
scenario of a failed Palestinian state, which would not prove
unable to meet the needs of its population, nor maintain
obligations undertaken in a peace agreement. Such a
1...,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94 96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,...112
Powered by FlippingBook