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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
plan and the fulfillment of the prophecy, then we must also
believe that the presence of another people in that land is
part of the same divine plan. On the basis of this belief, it is
clear to me that we must resolve the conflict between us, not
because fate has decreed that we must live here together,
but because we are fortunate that fate has destined us to
live here together and fulfill God’s will.”
12
The positions cited here are not those of the mainstream
of the various religious groups. Nevertheless, they are
an example of the need for a paradigm shift in the public
debate. Conventional wisdom has it that when a discourse
is founded on interests, it is possible to reach an outcome
that faithfully serves the interests of both sides. It is further
assumed, however, that the dichotomous language of religion
dictates a zero-sum attitude to political disputes. This is
indeed the case when the religious believers are unable to
express what they want to say in their own language and
are forced to participate in a public discourse based on
instrumental assumptions. As a result, religious positions
become unhappily associated with certain policy proposals
– policies that do not fundamentally need to be pursued –
giving those proposals an aura of religious sanctity. Creative
solutions may emerge when religious leaders talk to one
another, and the terminology of faith becomes a legitimate
language of negotiations. In the words of the head of a
yeshiva in southern Israel: “I can argue about politics in the
language of the newspaper, but in that conversation, there
is no advantage to my role as a rabbi. But perhaps there
is another language. Ask me what God wants of me, not
where the borders should be. Perhaps if we pay attention
to what the Torah has to say on this matter, we can learn
a few new things together about the borders too.”
13
In this
way, when the religious populations are able to approach
the fundamentals of the conflict in their own language and
based on their own worldview, core beliefs rooted in religious
traditions may serve as motivation to achieve peace, as
justification for agreement to reconciliation and a desire to
take joint responsibility to stop the bloodshed.
“A country without Judea, in what way
would it be Jewish?” – The price of peace
and those who pay it
Speeches delivered by Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon when
serving as prime ministers turned the phrase “painful
concessions,” used to describe the anticipated cost of an
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and especially the
evacuation of settlements, into a cliché. But who in Israeli
society would feel the pain of these concessions?
The word “occupation,” used to describe the Israeli control
of Judea and Samaria, can be understood in two ways. One
describes the holding of the territory, and the other the regime
under which the population lives. However, in the minds of
12 Interview, Jerusalem, April 2016.
13 Interview, southern Israel, June 2016.
large parts of the Israeli public, the two are intertwined. The
slogan of the religious right, “A nation cannot be an occupier
in its own land,” which is rooted in the bond that the Jewish
people has to the land of Israel, is used to refute accusations
coming from the field of international law. However, it is also
frequently used to respond to moral arguments, and to deny
as a matter of principle the injustices perpetrated against the
civilian population in Judea and Samaria. On the other hand,
the outrage sparked among parts of the Israeli public by
the fact of Israel’s military control of millions of Palestinians,
subsequently led to those Israelis becoming alienated from
those parts of the land where the Palestinians live, undoing
their sense of belonging to them. “The question is not whether
we are prepared to give the Palestinians these territories
out of the goodness of our hearts to reach peace,” said a
Knesset member from a leftist party, “but rather when we will
finally understand that they were not ours to begin with.”
14
When asked what price she would feel she was paying in
the context of an agreement, a high-ranking director of a
peace NGO replied: “If you’re asking whether I’ll miss Bet
El, then I’m sorry to disappoint you.”
15
The camp that currently fiercely opposes a peace agreement
is the one that will end up paying for it with the total eradication
of its lifework when the time comes, while the camp that is
proudly leading peace efforts will end up paying nothing at
all. In this situation, the political debate in Israel has ceased
to be a mere dispute about necessary policy measures.
When those that stress the importance of compromise do
not themselves have to make any concessions, any victory
for them would mean overwhelming defeat for an entire
political and ideological camp. Those who seek to increase
support for an agreement should ask themselves what price
its supporters may have to pay, and how its opponents might
benefit from it?
Conversations with various prominent religious-Zionist rabbis
reveal that in their minds, support for the establishment of
a Palestinian state casts doubt on the future Jewishness of
the State of Israel, and thus offers compelling evidence of
malicious intent. A particular channel that might allay their
concerns in this area involves “compensation” in the form
of an increased emphasis on the Jewishness of the state
in other areas.
The rabbi of a settlement in the Hebron Hills maintains that
increasing Jewish education in the non-religious public
school system would make territorial concessions easier for
him and his following to swallow: “If you want to take away
my home, promise that you’ll let me into yours. I’ll bring a
backpack filled with the Talmud, and if you pledge that
we will sit down together, the whole family, to learn in your
living room – then I’ll consider agreeing to pack my bags.
Otherwise, a country without Judea, in what way would it
be Jewish?”
16
14 Interview, Tel Aviv, July 2016.
15 Rishon Letzion, January, 2016.
16 Interview, Hebron Hills Regional Council, March 2016.
