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a schedule for historic decisions, those that touch on the very
heart of the Palestinian people, as well as the Muslim and
Arab world, could never succeed under such conditions. But
even this state of affairs cannot determine whether events
would have developed differently. Had all the interim terms
been met by Barak's government, or if better preparations
(such as the Stockholm talks) had been made previously –
would this truly have produced different outcomes? There
is no way to ascertain what could have happened, and it is
doubtful even the test of time will unravel this mystery.
Much has been said and written about the events during
Camp David, and therefore there is no need to repeat them.
The outcomes speak for themselves. The personalities of the
involved leaders, the conduct of the US during negotiations,
and President Clinton's trust in Barak's confidence and
attitude – all contrived to push events as they did. Barak
continued to lose political and public support, and Arafat
continued in his obstinate policy, extending it beyond his
legendary doggedness on core Palestinian issues to blatant
contempt of any Jewish attachment to the Temple Mount.
These barriers worked in tandem to create a sequence of
events that spiraled out of control.
During the Taba talks, proposals were made to the Palestinians
that Israel (and perhaps the US as well) considered impossible
to refuse. But this event was not only impeded by the
overwhelming forces already in play, it created new and
immediate concerns. Barak and Clinton attempted to set
a rigorous schedule for progress. But Arafat was riding the
great wave of approval after the Intifada with massive popular
support of the Palestinians, as well as many Arab states and
a significant number of European states, and therefore could
not accept the far-reaching terms presented to him.
***
The 2000s
The first decade of the 21st century was marked by difficult
events in the Middle East and around the globe. The Second
Intifada (beginning October 2000) slowly died down, and
conditions for the Palestinian people in Gaza and West Bank
deteriorated. In Israel, the prime ministers of this period were
unequivocally right-wing, asserting in their past attitudes that
could never be accepted by the Palestinians. Ironically, it
was these men who took the process the farthest, and who
initiated the most attempts at progress. Ariel Sharon decided
on a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and destruction
of Gush Katif settlements, and Ehud Olmert extended a
proposal to Abu Mazen in 2008 that in the view of the Israeli
public went far beyond Israel's agreement in Taba in late
2000. This proposal, like all rest, was also rejected.
Netanyahu rose to power a second time in the 2009 elections,
declaring his acceptance of the two-state solution. But the
peace process did not progress, and even added several
new impediments (that will not be discussed here).
Why did Abu Mazen refuse Olmert's 2008 proposal? It may
be that Abu Mazen did not feel he could bear the brunt of
such weighty and historic decisions when facing the array
of forces against him:
• Dealing with the
refugee
issue, while facing the Palestinian
diasporas in Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria.
• A determination regarding sovereignty over
Jerusalem
,
while facing the Arab and Muslim world.
•
Recognition of the Jewish state
, while facing the Arabs
of Israel.
Yasser Arafat, the historic figure who brought the Palestinians
to the very gates of the "promised land", would have had to
gain support from all three factors to finally resolve the conflict.
Perhaps Arafat knew legitimacy from all fronts would not be
achievable. For Abu Mazen, the task was almost impossible.
All of the above-mentioned barrier clusters played a role in
the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. These can be
divided as follows:
•
Super-barriers
•
Permanent barriers
•
Changing barriers
Super-barriers
– those defined as core issues, set against
the definition of the state of Israel as the Jewish state.
Permanent barriers
– those that stand at the root of an
organizational culture of decision making, of implementing
decisions and commitments, addressing and presenting
initiatives, and also providing counter-offers.
Changing barriers
– those barriers dependent on the
people involved in the process, (which, at least in democratic
countries, is a changing factor), as well as the atmosphere
and attitudes of the time.
The barriers that comprise these clusters may also be
attributed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As seen in this
paper, there is no single barrier that can be pointed to as the
one primary impediment to the process. Rather, it is usually
a combination of several barriers working in conjunction at
a given time. The only period in which one dominant factor
played a central role (although even here several others
were involved) was during the time of the massive series of
terrorist attacks in the years 1993-1996, and this generated
other barriers, particularly on the Israeli side. But even in this
case, one could not claim it was the only factor tipping the
scales against progress.
Chapter 7: How to extract ourselves from this
predicament? Possible directions to take.
Working assumptions
1. The Israeli government, currently and in the foreseeable
future, is a
right-wing government
.
2. The main issue that will always be of great concern to
the Israeli public is
personal security
.
