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The 34th government (Netanyahu's forth) was sworn in on
May 14, 2015. Its political composition, along with current
public sentiment, will not allow Netanyahu to budge an inch
from his statements of the eve of elections.
During this time the "Knife Intifada" also broke out, with Abu
Mazen and the PA deliberately praising the stabbing attacks
but, equally, also continuing security cooperation with Israel.
As for the Palestinians:
Abu Mazen faces difficulties on his home turf, both in his
political position within the PA and the Fatah, and with the
Hamas in the West Bank (a reality that becomes clearer
during preparations for municipal elections in the West Bank).
The Hamas in Gaza is coping with difficulties on all fronts.
The only external factor willing to help the Hamas on civilian
matters is Turkey, a country also embroiled in domestic political
problems, and whose actions are not always acceptable (to
put it mildly) to Egypt under Sisi's leadership. Sisi and his
security forces are openly hostile towards the Hamas.
A review of the current situation in relation to the clusters of
barriers mentioned in Chapter 2 indicate the following:
Super-barriers
– barriers that relate to and are rooted in
core issues, and therefore remain unchanged.
Permanent barriers
– the organizational culture, decision
making and overall view across time reveal no changes.
Changing barriers
– the (changeable) political factors
dependent on the people involved in the process, changes
of atmosphere and current attitudes.
On the Israeli side
– barriers have intensified, and PM
Netanyahu, whose fundamental ideology is itself a (permanent)
barrier, is surrounded by more radically right-wing people,
as well as public sentiment that is pressuring his party in the
Knesset and government. Throughout, Netanyahu has no one
within his political environment that may balance this position.
On the Palestinian side
– Abu Mazen's position as the
central decision maker is more difficult than ever before, and
he must deal with strident and forceful incitement against
Israel in West Bank media and social media.
Each side points to the
violence
, as they see it, of the other
side:
Palestinian incitement
– on the one hand, encourages young
people to perpetrate terrorist attacks, and on the other – is
used by
rejectionist factors
(both political and public) in
Israel as an argument against any peace process.
House demolition
– works as a powerful excuse/premise
for the leadership and public of both sides. The Israelis
make (internal) use of the demolition to prove resolve, while
for the Palestinians it increases frustration and the sense of
dependence on the Arab and international systems that at
present have no real desire to help them.
It seems that the only "involved party" currently interested in
international involvement is the Palestinians, while the Israeli
government would prefer to be left to its own devices.
In the current conditions (as previously described), what
may be expected from the international system?
1. All points presented in Chapter 7 of this paper (with all
the highpoints).
2. The unyielding demand from the Palestinians to reduce
the incitement level (including on social media), and thus
put Israel (and its government) to the test.
3. Differential policy regarding the Jewish settlements,
excluding those in the settlement blocks, thus also
appealing to the Israel public. Address of the settlements
beyond the blocks may be more forceful.
4. Making the same distinction in Jerusalem also.
5. Addressing interests of other powers in the region (and
the limitations and contrasts between them).
Chapter 5 – Additional factors
The Arabs of Israel
In 1967 the Arabs of Israel were physically linked to their
brothers in theWest Bank and emotionally tied to the Palestinian
cause, which had been (relatively) dormant throughout 1949-
1967. Although Israeli Arabs have always been part of the
Palestinian nationality and history, Palestinian leadership
has generally accepted their unique situation and therefore,
in all matters pertaining to active involvement in terrorism,
considered they should not be subject to the same demands
(some also maintain, with some reason, that they cannot
always be trusted. This is evidenced in the terms used for
them: "Arabs of the interior" or "the '48 Arabs"). In any case, the
Arabs of Israel were supposed to fulfil some role in the struggle.
When the Oslo Accords were signed on September 1993,
and with the formation of the PA a year later, the mainstream
of Israeli Arabs (including their central institutions and the
Hadash
51
/Communist Party as their primary political entity)
accepted these developments gladly.
However, the peace process produced conflicting effects on
the political orientation of Israel's Arabs. On the one hand, the
process did reflect (partially or fully) their national Palestinian
platform. On the other, the PA – although maintaining some
ties with them and their leadership – made sure to downplay
the issue of Israel's Arabs and dismissed them from peace
negotiations. In fact, PA leadership and that of the "territories"
dismissed the issue of the Israeli Arabs entirely.
52
The State
of Israel was certainly willing and even eager not to tie the
two issues together. But these were the circumstances only
during the early stages of the process. It was clear that the
two Arab factions – the fundamentalists (primarily the Islamic
Movement) and the radicals (currently the Balad Party) would
never allow the issue of the Arabs of Israel to be excluded
from the final conflict resolution.
51 An acronym for HaHazit HaDemokratit LeShalom uLeShivion, lit.
The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.
52 "The Arab Society in Israel – Information File. The Third Period
1993-2000". The Abraham Fund Initiative, May 2009 (in Hebrew).
