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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
The peace process signaled the start of increasing unity
among Israeli Arabs, and examination of their civil and
national status within Israel, but it also raised the issue then
termed the "opening of the '48 files".
53
The content of those
files was national in nature. The peace process blurred the
boundaries between their Palestinian and Israeli identities,
but did not resolve the inherent tension in this internal conflict.
"Palestinianization" did not address their national needs,
and "Israelization" rejected their civil needs. This situation
paved the way for the "localization of the national struggle",
meaning instilling Palestinian, national, Arab content into a
civil identity that was fundamentally Israeli.
54
That point in time began a process of gaining civil rights
for themselves, some seeing it as a purely civil matter,
while others considering it the step towards national
achievements.
The Al-Aqsa issue (al-Haramash-Sharif) is very significant
to all Arabs of Israel, and will continue to link them to the
Palestinian cause, along with the difficulty of accepting
the definition of Israel as the Jewish state and the ability
to identify with its symbols.
The management of their daily lives is also an issue
in its own right, greatly dependent on the attitude and
wisdom of the State of Israel, but the role of Israel's Arabs
in Palestinian reality may prove to be a weighty factor
influencing any Palestinian leader when the final and
permanent agreement must be signed. Israel's Arabs are
a central part of the conflicts core problems.
External factors
The external factors to the process – Arab and Muslim – do
not function as a single unit. These include countries and
powers that are often in conflict, even to the point of hostility:
• Countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel
(Egypt and Jordan) – Egypt was the first to "lay the
cornerstone" for the Oslo Accords when it agreed to peace
with Israel in the 1978 Camp David Summit.
- President Mubarak, having replaced Sadat after his
assassination in 1981, upheld his commitment to the
peace process, and can be viewed as the central
anchor of the Arab world that supported Yasser Arafat
during the Oslo process. It may be that his absence
during pivotal moments in Camp David was detrimental
to the process (although it is impossible to prove
whether his involvement would have produced a
dramatic shift or other outcomes).
- As for Jordan, whose relations with Arafat and the
Palestinian cause have been complicated, and whose
real interests regarding the holy sites (Al-Aqsa) do
not necessarily match those of the Palestinians, it
53 Eli Reches. "Reopening of the 1948 File", Haaretz newspaper, July
22, 2011.
54 "The Arab Society in Israel – Information File", ibid, p. 16.
has been a balancing and facilitating factor, certainly
during the reign of King Hussein.
• The Gulf states
- Saudi Arabia, a country that disagreed at the time
with Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the
Israel-Egypt peace agreement, has been looking for
a regional resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
for years now. It does so purely for its own interests.
- Qatar, due to its leader's policy, tends to support the
Hamas, but has failed over the years to become a
significant factor influencing the process.
• Syria – having supported the Palestinian rejectionist
organizations for many years, is currently not a state that
has any influence over the process. In the past, Syria
may have constituted an indirect factor by supporting
Palestinian rejectionists and the Hamas. However,
concurrent to the Oslo process, Syria also tried and
failed to establish peace with Israel.
• Turkey and Iran – two Muslim regional superpowers that
maintain a profound religious rivalry between them. Turkey
tried to make its stand in the region, but was rebuffed by
Egypt and Syria, and maintains very tense political ties
with them as a state. During the '90s, Turkey and Israel
did enjoy a diplomatic and security "honeymoon period",
with both greatly invested in the Palestinian issue and the
peace process. Then Erdo
ğ
an made a shift that benefits
the Hamas, with Turkey becoming the base for several of
its key agents. Since Morsi was removed from power in
Egypt, Turkey has struggled to actively support the Hamas.
• ISIS – its ideology constitutes a potential barrier to the
entire peace process in the region, although this has yet
to become evident.
• Hamas and Islamic Jihad – both in the West Bank and
in Gaza, these two organizations were and remain a risk
factor to the PA and the peace process. In the past, Arafat
preferred to avoid confrontation with them (resulting in
great waves of terrorist attacks), doing so only when their
actions endangered PA security. As security cooperation
improved, security forces learned to deal with them, even
conducting operations to fight against them. The power
of these organizations is based solely on public support,
a support that may depend on the economic situation
and political horizon.
• Hezbollah – a potential opposer to any kind of peace
process in our region. However, this organization was
not, and certainly is not today, of any direct impact on
the process. It may certainly have some indirect influence
(now and then inspired by Iran) if and when it decides to
"heat up" the area to incite an Israeli reaction, which in
turn will destabilize the situation for the Palestinians, as
well as the Hamas and Islamic Jihad – a series of events
that may disrupt the process, at least momentarily.
