67
them, that the Israeli team (PM Netanyahu, Foreign Minister
Sharon, and Defense Minister Mordechai) left for the Wye
Summit.
25
Thus, the difficulties (barriers) facing the Israeli team
were complex and convoluted: the basic (ideological) stand of
Netanyahu, the (often personal) agendas of members of Israeli
leadership, and the consistent pressure from the Israeli political
right. These significant barriers were also evident on the
Palestinian side, as will be presented in detail in the following.
Wye Summit – 1998
The summit was held throughout October 1998, and the
Wye River Memorandum was finalized on 23 October 1998.
The proposal presented prior to the summit by the Israelis
was rejected, and Palestinian pressure on the Americans
convinced them the proposal should not even be discussed.
From the Palestinian viewpoint, the proposal was very far
from meeting their demands, and they expressed a concern
that it would incite more violence. At this point the Americans
were in accord with the Palestinians.
The Wye Memorandum was designed to bring about
implementation of Oslo II from October 1995, as well as
the Hebron Agreement from January 1997, whereby Israel
committed to the three-phase withdrawal. The Memorandum
included the following points:
• Implementation of two of the three phases of Israeli
redeployment (as specified).
• Palestinian commitment to fight terrorism, including seizing
and confiscating weapons held by terror organizations
and arrests of operatives.
• Commitment of both parties to prevent incitement,
including establishing a US-Palestinian-Israeli committee
to oversee and track relevant developments.
• Defining a framework for requests for transfer of suspected
persons.
• Reaffirmation by Palestine National Council of January
1998 letter from PLO Chairman Arafat concerning the
nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions
that are inconsistent with the Oslo Accords.
• Resumption of permanent status negotiations on an
accelerated basis to achieve the mutual goal of reaching
an agreement by May 4, 1999, and commitment by both
parties to refrain from unilateral steps in the West Bank
and Gaza.
• An agreement that in the future steps would be taken to
improve civil and economic matters.
The Wye Summit had a significant number of barriers to
overcome – on the Israeli side, with varying opinions among
Israeli leadership, as well as Netanyahu's inconsistency as he
tried to avoid implementing gradual redeployment (by raising
options that were never accepted), while simultaneously
coping with unrelenting pressure from the staunchest Oslo
25 Ibid.
opponents from his own party, opposition from other right-
wing parties, and from the religious public and settlers. There
were also barriers on the Palestinian side, specifically the
ratification of the revised Palestinian National Charter.
In this case, it was theAmericans, under the personal leadership
of President Clinton, that effectively navigated the obstacles.
The US team members believed that Clinton's abilities and
great interpersonal skills in Wye were a sign that the US could
also successfully manage future negotiations regarding the
"big" issues.
26
Later, Clinton and his staff came to understand
that the enormous complexity of the Middle East, of both Israeli
and Palestinian leadership and the nations they represented,
made conflict resolution unfeasible despite Clinton's
excellent skills and personal commitment to the process.
27
Ultimately, it was probably the barriers on the Israeli side that
tipped the scales. Right-wing opposition to the agreement was
logical and expected. Netanyahu was given the opportunity
to expand his coalition with the inclusion of the Labor Party,
and enjoy broader support in the implementation of the Wye
Memorandum (beginning gradual withdrawal). However, he
also made efforts to stabilize the existing coalition, already on
the verge of falling apart due to strong opposition to territorial
concessions. This constant backtracking of Netanyahu,
including messages indicating he would not implement the
second phase of the agreement, caused rifts within the camp of
Oslo supporters in thegovernment, primarily YitzhakMordechai,
a fact that only accelerated its collapse (although ostensibly
the collapse occurred following the national budget vote).
In December of 1998, Netanyahu resigned his post, resulting
in the May 1999 elections and Ehud Barak's rise to power.
Ehud Barak's premiership (1999-2001)
Ehud Barak was elected onMay 17, 1999, and throughout early
July he formed his government, including the Haredi parties
and the left-wing Meretz Party. Electing Barak revitalized the
peace process (although there were clear signs the process
still had some life to it even under Netanyahu's leadership).
It also raised expectations among the Palestinians, in
neighboring Arab countries (who had also signed peace
agreements with Israel), in Europe, and most especially in
the US government. Even Hafez al-Assad, in interviews with
his biographer, Patrick Seale, stated that he saw Barak as
a man willing and capable of achieving peace.
28
Barak met
with leaders of the region – President Mubarak, King Hussein
and his son, Abdullah, but agreed to meet with Arafat on
only a few occasions. It is unclear why Barak avoided Arafat
personally – was it due to personal reservations he had or
fear of public opinion in Israel? In any case, this avoidance
was very evident. Also evident was the fact that Barak was
attempting to do things "differently", preferring that those
deeply involved in early stages of the process now be
26 Miller, ibid, p. 280.
27 Ibid., p. 281.
28 "Manual for a Wounded Dove" by Yossi Beilin. Miskal – Yediot
Aharonoth and Chemed Books, 2001. (p. 74).
