75
Chapter 6 – Barriers until now and in the
future
I have reviewed the Oslo process in its various stages so
that the facts, in their chronological order, may allow us to
systematically examine the difficulties and obstacles that
caused the process to fail. These facts will be examined in
the following division of time periods:
1993-1996
This stage is considered the "honeymoon period" of the peace
process for three primary reasons:
• The process was still in its infancy and unfolding with a
great sense of historic drama: Rabin and Arafat shook
hands, they signed the Declaration of Principles, and
there was mutual recognition between the State of Israel
and the PLO.
• This was still an interim stage far from actual historical
resolutions, certainly those pertaining to core issues, as
these were planned to be dealt with later in the process.
• The leaders of the process, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon
Peres, were completely committed to it.
But was the honeymoon period really so sweet? Were there
no signs of the impediments, obstacles and other influencing
factors even then? From the Israeli perspective, this was merely
an interim period (the advantage of the Oslo process), and it
is doubtful whether Israeli leadership made it clear (to itself or
the Israeli and Palestinian publics) what the final destination
would be. The idea of the two-state solution was never even
mentioned as an end goal.
55
It seems even Rabin and Peres
did not fully agree on the desired final outcome
56
. The fact
that Israeli leaders of the time, although unquestionably
committed to the process, still left the destination unclear
(an issue that arose again during Barak's time) caused
confusion among their subordinates, and made all options
seem possible.
57
Even during this period the construction
of Jewish settlement continued in earnest, creating distrust
among the Palestinians as to Israel's true intentions.
From the Palestinian perspective – Arafat never made the
mental shift from thinking in terms of a military struggle to using
diplomacy and statecraft,
58
a fact made clear even during this
early stage. He was also insensitive to the (justified) concern
among the Israeli public regarding matters of personal and
public security. He preferred dealing with the Hamas through
talks, and avoided conflict. In November of 1994, his agents
killed 19 Hamas operatives in Gaza only after Arafat finally
understood they were acting to undermine his rule – and not
to thwart any terrorist attacks in Israel.
55 "Twenty Years After Oslo: A personal and historical perspective",
by Ron Pundak. S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue
and Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 2014.
56 Interview with Yair Hirschfeld.
57 Pundak, ibid.
58 Ibid.
Arafat also used ambiguous terms in his speech on May 23,
1994 in Johannesburg before the Palestinians, comparing
the Oslo Accords to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, signed with
the Quraysh tribe. The prophet Muhammad later violated
that agreement, opening the door to reconquer Mecca. This
statement was made public, creating turmoil in the political
system, and even more so among the Israeli public.
But even this did not sway public opinion in Israel. On June
1994, the general Peace Index was measured at 55.2%,
continuing to rise in the followingmonths and reaching 64.95%
by September of that year. The Oslo Index at that time was
around 51%, reaching its peak in August of that year with
54.5%, then gradually falling to 47.4% at the year's close.
Throughout 1995, the Peace Index ranged from 51% to
59.75%, and the Oslo Index ranged from 43.7% to 47%,
a trend that lasted until October 1995. The assassination
of Rabin boosted these numbers to its peak (Peace Index,
73%, and Oslo Index, 57.9%). Then, 1996 began with a drop
in numbers, although they still remained high and stable.
However, the terrible wave of terrorist attacks in February
and March toppled the Oslo Index and belief in the peace
process, eventually leading to the election of Benjamin
Netanyahu to power. It should be noted that the Syria Index
was also measured during that period, with results always
significantly lower than both Peace and Oslo indexes. There
are two possible reasons for this – either a general distrust
of peace with Syria, or the perception that this peace was
less urgent and important to the Israeli public.
When trying to point to the factors that obstructed progress
to peace during this "honeymoon" period,
it appears that
the most significant and dominant factor
(during this time)
was the suicide bombings
, a product of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad policy in combination with Arafat's unwillingness/fear to
confront those organizations and act forcefully to thwart them.
The other factors (the attitudes of both leaderships and Arafat's
conduct) had marginal influence at this point and produced
no substantive impact on the process. Additionally, regional
players were not significant barriers at this time.
Even the continued construction of the Jewish settlements
(not mentioned in the Declaration of Principles) did not play
a central role during this period.
In contrast, the assassination of Rabin on November 4, 1995,
an act of Jewish terrorism, was a destructive milestone in
the process. But two points must be stated candidly in this
matter – that it is impossible to predict how events would
have unfolded if Rabin had lived, and that Israeli public
opinion did not waver in its support of the process even after
Rabin was murdered. Quite the opposite – public support
increased after the assassination, and it was the wave of
bombings that occurred later that unnerved the public and
changed the Israeli electoral map.
All these may be put into professional terms – barriers that
are strategic, psychological and organizational. Although I
believe it was the wave of terrorist attacks that constituted
the dominant factor influencing this stage of the process, it
