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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
of his camp, and certainly the political center and left-wing,
and his name would go down in history for the achievement.
If they refused – he would gain further support from his own
(right-wing) coalition.
I cannot truly determine Arafat's true motivation for refusing
this initiative – was he concerned this would perpetuate
a permanent state of affairs that was far from what the
Palestinians hoped for (specifically regarding Jerusalem
and the refugees)? Was he concerned about facing his rivals
within the PA and Fatah? Afraid of facing the Hamas? Or the
Palestinian public? These are all possibilities. Experience
has shown that any attempt at dealing with the core issues
that touch on the sensitive nerves of all involved parties
in the Middle-Eastern conflict could incite opposition that
could provoke violence. Dr. Yair Hirschfeld supports this
view, maintaining that Arafat was fearful that the Palestinian
and Israeli camps were so far apart, even among Oslo
supporters, that it could set off another crisis (in a well-
established dynamic).
20
The terrorist bombings continued even throughout 1997,
although on a smaller scale than in previous years, resulting
in 24 fatalities and dozens of casualties. The attacks (as
those previously and the ones that followed) played a
central role in the process – they constituted an extremely
powerful lever in the hands of opponents in Israel, pushing
the government to stop the process ("there is no one to give
land and responsibility to"). For PM Netanyahu, struggling
to deal with the pull in opposite directions, the bombings
served as justification to stop all progress, even delaying
implementation of previous agreements (the three-phase
withdrawal and other issues).
The third (and central) factor in the process, the US, considered
the situation a seeming dead end;
21
while the parties were
making attempts to continue talks and progress to some
resolution, each, due to their own constraints, became
further entrenched in their own positions. It was during this
period that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright first
became involved.
On August 6, 1997, Albright stressed that: "…The sine qua
non for progress is a mutual commitment to security against
violence", and also that: "We cannot expect 100 percent
success. But there must be 100 percent effort". She also
added that: "…Both sides agree to settle their differences
over the subjects of negotiation at the bargaining table, and
not somewhere else".
22
Clearly her remarks were an attempt
to speak to the interests of both parties, particularly when
addressing the violence – an issue of importance to each
side, although each with their own attitude to it. Did her
phrasing successfully address all of the barriers impacting
the process? Probably not.
20 Interview with Yair Hirschfeld, June 23, 2016, Ramat Yishai.
21 Hirschfeld, "Oslo: A Formula for Peace; from Negotiations to
Implementation", p. 252.
22 Ibid.
In late September of 1997, Secretary Albright met with the
Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and Abu Mazen, managing
to agree on four key points: continued Israeli-Palestinian
security cooperation and efforts to battle terrorism, including
dismantling terrorist infrastructure; continued redeployment,
as specified in the letter of the US Secretary of State from
January 17, 1997; determination of a specified time frame
for unilateral steps to consolidate stances and ensure the
preconditions of each party necessary for permanent status
negotiations; and establishment of an accelerated negotiating
process for permanent solution with both parties agreeing to a
target date. Later on, the Palestinians presented a document
detailing the steps they were committed to taking against
terrorism and violence, and then an amended version of the
Palestinian Charter, having removed any article that conflicted
with the Oslo Accords. They were urged to do this by the US
and peace process supporters in Israel.
23
A plan was drafted by the American peace process team
in preparation for the Wye Summit, planned for October
1998, based on the assumption that there was total distrust
between the parties. The plan was also designed to address
the security interests of both parties, and bring them closer
without necessarily producing a compromise. This approach
was in keeping with the initial Oslo "spirit" throughout 1992-
1996. After one round of the Americans scurrying between
the parties, Arafat finally agreed to the plan in return for Israeli
withdrawals that would expand Palestinian territories (shift
from area C to B, and from B to A). Concurrently, the Israelis
produced a plan drafted by (newly appointed) Foreign Minister
Ariel Sharon (previously Minister of National Infrastructure),
designed to provide a framework for a permanent agreement
allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state on 50% of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the other core issues
(Jerusalem, refugees, and even borders) scheduled for future
discussion without any time limits on the date.
Sharon's proposal held numerous advantages in the face of
Israeli barriers. It had the potential to be widely accepted
in the Israeli political system, and certainly gain significant
support from members of the Labor Party. Nevertheless, it
was also clear this proposal would generate strong opposition
from the more extreme right-wing members of the Likud, the
National Religious Party, and additional right-wing parties in
the coalition, with a push from the religious block – people of
the Yesha Council and Yesha Rabbinical Council.
The point was moot, as the Palestinians rejected Sharon's
proposal. In their view, any agreement on a permanent solution
must include the establishment of a Palestinian state on all
areas of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as resolutions
regarding other issues – Jerusalem, the refugees, the Jewish
settlements, security arrangements, water, and neighbor
relations.
24
To maintain their reputation, both in the eyes of the
Palestinian public and the US, they insisted on implementation
of full IDF withdrawal – phases 2 and 3 of redeployment. It was
in these conditions, and with personal disagreements between
23 Ibid., p. 253.
24 Ibid., p. 254.
