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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
can also be described in the terms mentioned here, as all
these factors relate and intertwine in their impact on events.
1996-1999
Netanyahu served as prime minister during these years,
the man who previously led the protests against the Oslo
agreement, but then declared on the eve of elections that
he would uphold it (safeguarding the principle of continuity).
During the early days of his premiership, Netanyahu did keep
his word, sending representatives to meet with Arafat and
his aides, and appointing several senior members of the
government who were known as supporters of the peace
process. However, he was still weighed down, morally and
electorally, by various ministers and government members
from his own party, as well as members of his right-wing
coalition, along with settler representatives (Yesha Council
and Yesha Rabbinical Council). They believed Netanyahu
owed them a moral debt that should not be violated. This
was a delicate line to tread, especially when considering
Netanyahu's ideological upbringing, and the increasing
commitment of the US president to furthering the process,
particularly after Rabin's assassination.
The pressure from the US (especially after the Western Wall
Tunnel riots), the construction on Har Homa, and the continued
expansion of Jewish settlements – all brought Netanyahu to
vacillate back and forth, resulting in two major outcomes:
• Political instability of his government and coalition.
• Increasing distrust on the Palestinian side.
The Palestinians continued the suicide bombings, although
on a much smaller scale, producing two effects: further
undermining the trust of the Israeli public in the Oslo process
(although the polls demonstrate they continued to score the
general Peace Index highly), and providing more arguments/
justifications for anyone opposing the process, including
PM Netanyahu.
The Palestinians, with Arafat in the lead, remained obtuse
to the incredible sensitivity of the Israeli public to personal
security. Arafat, with no true comprehension of how Israelis
viewed these bombings, failed to consider how they would
react. With few options, Israel had no recourse but to institute
a more severe security policy (arrests, curfews, roadblocks,
blockades, and forbidding entrance into the country), a
response that only aggravated the Palestinian public and
worsened their situation, and was even more detrimental
to the process.
In the times Netanyahu did try to push forward with the
process, he favored pushing for a permanent agreement, in
contrast to Arafat – who preferred (in fact, insisted) that all
interim agreement conditions must first be met (the 3-stage
IDF withdrawal). What were the interests of each party?
• Arafat – persisted in the view that "a bird in the hand is
worth two in the bush", and was concerned the two parties
were not ready for a real discussion regarding permanent
terms (meaning resolving core issues).
• Netanyahu – feared agreeing to too many interim terms,
including withdrawals and concessions, without any
appropriate compensation from the Palestinians, so that
when the time did come for permanent resolutions, hewould
have less resources to bargain with. One could also posit
that he wanted to stall for time, for well-known reasons. It
is impossible to determine which of these motivations were
more important, but the two were surely interconnected.
At this point, the US was actively involved in the process,
certainly more so than previously. It is possible that had the
US pushed even harder for both parties to adhere to the "Oslo
spirit", the chances of success would have been improved.
In contrast to the three previous years (1993-1996), where we
point to the suicide bombings as the most dominant factor
disrupting the process, during this time a combination of
factors were more in play. Netanyahu's basic attitude, his lack
of determined leadership in advancing the process, the lack
of unity within Israeli leadership, heterogeneity of his coalition
when Netanyahu still had to contend with the commitments he
made to the electorate base that brought him to power – and
conversely, Arafat's conduct and occasional tirades, and the
unending series of terrorist attacks – all of which created an
amalgamation of factors that cut short the process.
The motivations: strategic, psychological, and structural-
organizational (of each party) are clearly evident in each of
the arguments present in the above.
1999-2001
Under Ehud Barak's premiership, one could argue that
attempts were made to amend all the (failed) actions taken
up to that point. But it had to cope with all the old difficulties
and frustrations, and unfortunately added also new difficulties
into the mix.
Barak, probably because of his personal disposition, acted
almost completely alone (although Gilead Sher disagrees
with this assertion). From the outset, Barak declared his
intention to take a different approach from Oslo, even going
so far as to exclude those involved in Oslo from the process
(at least until the later period of his premiership). Barak did
not approve of the interim terms and (like his predecessor),
tried to stall their implementation. This policy, along with his
personality, generated even more distrust between him and
Arafat, who was hoping for some leeway after Netanyahu's
tougher attitude.
Barak made political mistakes, and struggled to maintain the
stability of his coalition, which had many members that did
not support the process. As they neared the pivotal moments
of decision, he continued to lose the support of his political
base. He held to the belief (logical, but also quite arrogant)
that when he finally achieved a resolution, this would gain
him back the popular and political support he had lost. This
probably stemmed from his certitude that he could finalize
an agreement with the Palestinians, and with Arafat, on his
terms. However, Barak failed to read the political map, or the
people involved in it, correctly. He could not see that dictating
