70
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
beholder" (a problem that may even arise when agreements
are officially signed and finalized).
The dilemma of the Israeli teamwas whether they could arrive
at a comprehensive agreement without touching on issues
relating to Jerusalem and the holy sites. The idea was to try
for an exchange on the issues themselves,
42
while insisting
on substantive Palestinian concessions. Meanwhile, the
Palestinians believed they had already made the greatest
concession by signing the Oslo Accords, ceding 78% of
the Land of Israel. Abu Alaa proposed the parties discuss
and summarize each issue individually, a proposal that was
rejected by the Israelis as they feared this would force them
to maximal concessions.
The two parties also disagreed on the order of discussed
topics.
43
The Palestinians preferred first addressing the
principles, such as Israel's agreement to the '67 borders, and
only then delve into specifics. The Israelis preferred to first
review the practical arrangements (borders, security, refugees),
and only after coming to some resolutionmove on to principles.
From the Israeli point of view, determining '67 borders at the
outset constituted a "precondition" that was unacceptable.
Abu Alaa's situation was also precarious, even grim.
Conducting talks while violent riots raged in the territories
put him under pressure. He feared that in the current climate,
his more pragmatic approach regarding the refugees would
mark himas theman who had given up "Palestinian Orthodoxy"
(meaning the sanctity of the Palestinian cause – the right
of return, the Palestinian homeland, Jerusalem, and the
security prisoners). Meanwhile, news of the talks leaked out,
and Abu Alaa felt throughout that he had no support from
Arafat.
44
His relationship with Abu Mazen also proved to be an
impediment to the Swedish talks; Abu Mazen was angry that
this channel of negotiations had been established without his
knowledge, that it included people he found unacceptable,
and because Abu Alaa had agreed to discuss specifics
without first establishing an agreement of principles. For all
these reasons, Abu Alaa eventually agreed to accept Abu
Mazen's leadership and seniority,
45
thus denying himself the
chance of moving forward in the talks.
Arafat's lack of support and detachment from talks conducted
by his own representatives, particularly through secret
channels, stems from a problematic "organizational culture"
of the Palestinians, an issue which may itself have been a
significant barrier to negotiations.
This led the Israeli team to certain insights, particularly the
understanding that the Palestinian system was struggling to
make decisions, and progress would require international
support. This was the only way to clarify the limits of Israeli
concessions to Arafat.
46
It was in this difficult climate that
both parties arrived at the Camp David Summit.
42 Ibid.
43 Ben Ami, ibid, p. 50.
44 Interview with Shlomo Ben Ami.
45 Beilin, ibid, p. 116.
46 Interview with Shlomo Ben Ami.
From Camp David to Taba Summit
The parties did not arrive at the Camp David Summit in the
best of terms. By this time, Barak had lost much of his political
support and his coalition was collapsing. Riots and violent
outbreaks in the territories weakened public support and his
legitimacy in making concessions and painful decisions, and
Barak felt time slipping away. Arafat was practically dragged
to the summit by Clinton pressuring him to attend. Each
party claimed the other had rescinded positions previously
agreed on in the Stockholm talks. Trust between the parties,
particularly their leaders, was nonexistent.
By July 2000, President Clinton's time was also growing short,
with only several months left to his term.
The talks in Camp David commenced with Barak's proposal
of a map that left Israel with an area of 8-10% of the disputed
lands, without any territorial exchange, and with Jerusalem
under Israeli sovereignty. The Palestinians made no
counteroffer, making the Israelis feel that any suggestion
on their part would be rejected outright.
With this view, the Israeli team decided to present Clinton its
terms on the following points: annexation of 10-12%of theWest
Bank, status of the settlement blocks and Jewish settlements
not recognized by international law, security arrangements,
Israel's strategic needs, and the Jordan Valley. Jerusalem
was included in the points raised before the president.
47
At
the same time, the Israelis proposed several conciliatory
arrangements for the Palestinians, such as a "safe passage
corridor", and economic and civil benefits.
Another discussion with Clinton, Shlomo Ben-Ami, and Saeb
Erekat touched on the matter of Jerusalem and the holy
sites. Ben-Ami proposed that the inner envelope of Arab
neighborhoods would be under a functional autonomy, the
TempleMount under a Palestinian trusteeship (subject to Israeli
sovereignty), and the outer envelope of Arab neighborhoods
would be under Palestinian or Israeli sovereignty – per
demographic division. The Palestinians countered with a
demand for sovereignty over the entire Old City, excluding
the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall.
48
Clinton initiated a simulation game on Jerusalem during
the discussions, during which suggestions were made
by the Israelis also addressing the outer neighborhoods,
inner neighborhoods, Old City and Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa
Mosque. Clinton was satisfied with this development,
49
but
the Palestinians reacted by making no counterproposals, and
instead hurling accusations at the Israelis and demanding
reparations for the "conquest". At one point, incited by Clinton's
anger at their behavior, Arafat stated he was willing to concede
8-10% of the West Bank, but insisted that for him and his
team the core issue would always be Jerusalem. Clinton's
focus on Jerusalem in the simulation game indicated he
47 "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001 - Within
Reach", by Gilead Sher. Routledge Publishing; 2006 (p.226).
48 Ibid., p. 229.
49 Interview with Shlomo Ben Ami.
