64
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
of which were planned and executed by Hamas members.
Although the first attack (the Mehola Junction bombing in the
Jordan Valley on April 15, 1993) occurred several months prior
to the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords), the bombings
seared into Israeli collective memory and consciousness are
the ones executed in 1994 and 1995:
• Afula Bus car bombing, April 1994.
• Hadera central bus station bombing, April 1994.
• Dizengoff Street bus bombing, October 1994.
• Netzarim Junction bombing, November 1994.
• Binyanei Hauma parking lot bombing in Jerusalem,
December 1994.
• Two bombings in the Beit Lid Junction (by Islamic Jihad),
January 1995.
• Kfar Darom bus bombing (by Islamic Jihad), April 1995.
• Karnei Netzarim Junction car bombing, April 1995.
• Ramat Gan (route 20) bus bombing, July 1995.
• Jerusalem (route 26) bus bombing, August 1995.
There were 78 fatalities caused by these terrorist bombings,
most which were executed in the central cities of Israel – an
astonishingly high number during a peace and reconciliation
process.
Naturally, the bombings touched on issues of personal security
- a raw nerve of Israeli society, and brought up all the other
barriers deterring progress on the Israeli side: psychological,
ideological, and political. It was in this atmosphere, and
in the face of mass public protests, that Israeli leadership
attempted to push forward to the Oslo II Accords.
Meanwhile, the US found itself overseeing the Oslo peace
process despite never having put much faith in its chances
of success, and with the two opposing parties preferring to
manage negotiations directly and through secret channels,
informing the Americans about developments only after
the fact. Aaron Miller, who served as advisor to several US
secretaries of state,
12
addressed the passive role of the US
throughout the process as both a positive and negative factor.
As a positive influence, US passivity urged the parties to find
their own way to some resolutions, but lack of US guidance
also left them to their own devices, producing an agreement
too difficult to implement due to the differing expectations
of each party. It should be noted that during Rabin's term
and following the Declaration of Principles (1992-1995), the
population of Jewish settlers in the West Bank grew by 46%,
13
with Israel continuing rapid construction in the Jerusalem
area and establishing security roadblocks. The Americans
refrained from citing illegal settlements not mentioned in the
Oslo principles to Rabin, but they considered the settlements
a violation of the spirit of the agreement and establishment
12 "The Much Too Promised Land", by Aaron David Miller, translated
into Hebrew by Guy Herling), Miskal – Yediot Aharonoth and Chemed
Books, 2008.
13 Ibid., p. 257.
of trust between parties. The Americans also held back from
demanding that Arafat restrict Hamas and Islamic Jihad
operations, and did not clarify to him that the freedom of
action he granted them in order to preserve internal Palestinian
peace may undermine the entire process. At this stage, and
perhaps to the detriment of its own interests, US passivity
became a deterring, rather than beneficial, factor. There was
no one who truly had a "bird-eye view" of the process, no
factor constituting an objective overseeing mechanism that
could call out the parties when they veered away from the
spirit of the agreement principles.
14
The elections held on May 29, 1996, immediately following the
trauma of Rabin's assassination, and moreover – the terrible
bombings of February-March 1996, brought about a political
change and the rise to power of Benjamin Netanyahu.
Benjamin Netanyahu – First premiership
(1996-1999)
Despite Benjamin Netanyahu's declaration on the eve of
the elections asserting his commitment to the Oslo process
(while insisting on territorial continuity), one should keep in
mind the ideological roots of the man. Throughout his time
as opposition leader (1992-1996), Netanyahu stood at the
forefront of the political struggle against the Oslo Accords, and
was identified as one of their primary opponents. He made
numerous speeches, participated in the funeral procession
in Raanana Junction and the great protest in Zion Square in
Jerusalem, and gave interviews on the sites of past terrorist
attacks. Due to his ideological beliefs, it is obvious why
his commitment to the process could never match that of
previous leadership. Netanyahu’s government was based
on right-wing and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties (Shas and
Degel Hatorah – "Flag of Torah"), who were on the extreme
right. Initially, there were also several government members
and bodies that either supported Oslo or did not clearly
oppose it, such as Meir Sheetrit, Yitzhak Mordechai and
also Haderekh Hashlishit ("The Third Way") Party, headed by
Avigdor Kahalani (previously a member of the Labor Party).
They faced the staunch opponents to the peace agreement,
including Uzi Landau and Benjamin "Benny" Begin, which
formed a far more right-wing coalition than the previous
one, but was also quite heterogeneous. Netanyahu did not
"require" any pressure from those parties and right-wing
ideologists and religious factions, as his policy was essentially
in accord with their expectations. His stance was founded in
those selfsame elements: psychological (including genuine
security concerns), ideological and structural.
However, Netanyahu's personal political outlook began to
crumble very soon into his premiership. He was forced to take
actions that strained his relations with right-wing factors, first
due to his own announcement on the night of the elections
and then when coping with pressure from the international
community (primarily the US), but even these actions failed
to contribute significantly to the peace process.
14 Ibid., p. 267.
