54
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
among the Palestinian people, that began with the failure of
the revolt in 1936-1939, continued in the years of confusion
and stagnation in 1939-1945, with harbingers of revival
before the war in 1945-1948, the 1948 war, the “Nakba”,
and in the period from 1948 to 1967, which he calls “from
Nakba to Naksa” (Nakba = disaster, Naksa = defeat). Kabha
argues that the development of the Palestinian minority in
Israel was the result of three triangles, between and around
which Palestinian history unfolded and continues to unfold.
52
The first triangle includes the world powers, the Arab states
and Israel. In time, the international actors changed, and
accordingly their degree of involvement, especially of the
superpowers. The attitude of the Arab states towards the
Palestinians also changed, especially after the defeat
suffered by Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967, which led to
the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel.
In addition to the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, from
June 1967 on, the inhabitants of these territories moved
from the control of Jordan and Egypt respectively to Israeli
control. The Israeli occupation changed over the years, but
remains in place and continues to impact the lives of both
the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories and their fellow
Palestinians who are citizens of the State of Israel.
The second triangle is related to national identity: the pan-
regional Arab, the local Palestinian and the Islamic-political
dimensions. This context has also seen significant changes.
In the last two decades, political Islam has swung back into
the heart of the Palestinian experience in the West Bank and
Gaza. As these words are being written, Palestinian identity
is swinging between the Palestinian secular heritage and
the path offered by Hamas, with its religious and political
content and goals.
The third triangle is related to internal social changes that
have occurred among the Palestinians. In general terms, it
may be stated that the Arab-Palestinian nationalism, with its
revolutionary-secular nature, its organization and fronts, has
been led by various members of the liberal professionals
and intellectuals. On the other hand, the first and second
intifadas brought the masses into the circle of political action,
both the masses living in villages and cities, as well as young
people in schools and in the streets.
Kabha’s innovative review and analysis reveal a wide range
of forces that have helped shape the actions and aspirations
of the Palestinian people in the diaspora. Based on Kabha’s
analysis, five principal conclusions may be drawn:
1. The failure of the 1936-1939 revolt, the years of stagnation
that followed and the crushing defeat of 1948 offer
clear indications regarding the mistaken assessments
made by the Palestinian people, which led to failure
and disintegration. This resulted in the dispersal of the
Palestinian people and the establishment of Israel in 1948.
2. The Palestinian national identity took shape in the
circumstances of the war and struggle both against the
52 Mustafa Kabha, The Palestinians – A Nation and Its Diaspora,
Ra’anana: The Open University, 2010, pp. 291-292.
Zionist movement and the British Mandate. This fact
obstructed the path to the formation of an independent
Palestinian identity, one that could renew itself and
address the needs of Palestinian nationalism. Instead,
there has been cyclicality, imitation, import of old-new
mechanisms that essentially evince a reliance on the past
(failures, disintegration, internal conflicts) as opposed to
ambitions derived from the future, which involve learning
from the past and scholarly, calculated and consensual
new beginnings on the internal, regional and international
level.
3. On the social level: the entire Palestinian people
(elites and all other classes) participate in Palestinian
nationalism despite the contrasts and contradictions
between organizations and fronts. This situation of “we
have a little of everything” actually leads to the creation
of fronts and constant clashes, entrenching the division
and causing us to lose our way.
4. The three above conclusions form the basis for the claim
that the situation in which the Palestinian people live in
its diaspora both conceptually and in practice offers a
unique opportunity for new operational methods that
demonstrate a broader consensus within and among the
currents in the Palestinian National Movement, especially
among the Palestinian people as a whole. On the other
hand, the three above conclusions could also lead us
towards a diametrically opposed scenario, involving yet
more schisms, distancing, struggles and even the use of
violence. In my view, both scenarios are possible in the
absence of a consensus as broad and comprehensive
as possible within the Palestinian people regarding a
peace agreement with Israel, which would bring about a
drastic change in the positions of both sides, and certainly
impact the entire region and enjoy widespread support.
5. Consequently, the main task is related to the Palestinian
people, and more precisely, is associated with major
changes on the social and political level that will drive
a democratization process within the society and the
territories of the Palestinian Authority, while similar
processes should be taking place wherever Palestinians
live in the diaspora. A drastic increase in the features
of the democratization within Palestinian society and
politics will increase the chances and opportunities for
cooperation and coexistence between Israel and the
Palestinians, as well as with the various countries of the
Middle East – including Israel.
In the context of the Arab-Palestinians in Israel, Kabha
discusses two aspects: The first relates to the circumstances
of the creation of the “Arab-Palestinian national minority in
Israel.” The author uses this term to describe the Arabs in
Israel based on a discussion of the terminology, which in his
view is dependent on the period or political outlook involved.
He quotes the political scientist Benyamin Neuberger who
describes the singular situation faced by this minority:
“The Arabs in Israel are simultaneously a numerical and
sociological minority. They are a numerical minority for