63
longer invested in the arms race. We will live in a Middle East
of peace, a common market of irrigation systems, tourism,
transportation, communications, and collaborations of culture,
energy and science." This statement, different in its tone
although still very general, does not explain how this vision
will be accomplished, or with which partners, and it does
not contradict the three limits already established by Rabin.
The negotiations, conducted through secret channels, led to
the signing of a 13-point agreement on September 1993, titled
the – "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-. Government
Arrangements". The goal was to establish an agreement that
would lead to national separation, eventually allowing the
establishment of a limited sovereignty Palestinian state. In the
interim, an alternative framework would manage Palestinian
affairs (as specified in the 1994 Paris agreements). Conversely,
the Palestinians were focused from the outset on establishing
a fully independent state, preferably a confederation with
Jordan that would also support common interests with Israel.
9
On September 23, 1993 the Knesset ratified the Declaration of
Principles, with a majority of 61 votes in favor, 50 against, eight
abstaining and one absent. This count reveals that several
MKs from the opposition did not vote against the ratification.
The Declaration of Principles determined that negotiations
would lead to a permanent settlement based on Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
10
The goal was to strive for
a speedy interim agreement whereby Israel would withdraw
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas. The two parties
would also come to several partial agreements regarding
the following issues:
• Security, Jerusalem, refugees – arrangements for the
interim period.
• On May 4, 1994 the Cairo Agreement ("Gaza–Jericho
Agreement") was signed and implemented in the weeks
immediately following the signing. Naturally, the Oslo
process provoked strong opposition from the political right
in Israel, including the right-wing parties of the Knesset
at the time, headed by the Likud and the ideological
right – primarily Yesha (Judea and Samaria) settlers and
the religious public that believes that the sanctity of the
Holy Land supersedes any state decision. The main
arguments were: fear of returning to the "Green Line" and
the "narrow waist" of Israel, representing Israeli borders
prior to the Six Day War, the sense of siege and suffocation
or the statement attributed at the time to Abba Eban that
the "1967 Lines are Auschwitz borders". However, apart
from the (understandable) security concerns, there were
other factors particularly significant to this segment of
the religious public, such as ceding ancestral territories
(considered anathema). Also, there was concern regarding
a return to the "'67 Line", which had become a (negative)
symbol, both to the Israeli public and a large part of
the political system. These circumstances provoked a
general resistance to any concession. In addition, there
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
were apprehensions and distrust of the Palestinians, and
certainly Arafat, who was himself a (demonic) symbol.
At this point, opposition to the process was primarily political in
nature, having to "cope" with the (justifiably) positive atmosphere
in the Israeli public. Current events contributed greatly to
improving Israel's international standing, strengthening ties
with additional Arab and Muslim states. After many years of
secret contacts the peace agreement with Jordan was signed
on October 26, 1994, and additionally there was PM Peres's
visit to Morocco, and later to Oman and Indonesia (the country
with the largest Muslim population in the world). In 1996,
PM Peres also visited in Qatar, thus laying the foundation
for state and economic relations that were maintained
until 2009, when these ties were severed during Operation
Cast Lead. The new situation also impacted investments
in Israel and the opening of new markets, a development
that led to significant economic growth during those years.
On October 5, 1995, prior to ratifying the Oslo II interim
agreement, Rabin spoke before the Knesset and set forth
his view of the permanent agreement:
11
"We view the permanent solution in the framework of
the State of Israel, which will include most of the area of
the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British
Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will
be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this
to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will
independently run the lives of the Palestinians under
its authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during
the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which
existed before the Six Day War."
Two important points in Rabin's speech reveal his view of
a permanent resolution: it does not refer to a Palestinian
state (but rather something that is "less than a state"), and
it includes the determination that Israel will not return to the
'67 border. One month later, on November 4, 1995, Rabin
was assassinated, making it impossible to ascertain how
events would have unfolded had he lived. On their part, the
Palestinians always strived for a fully independent state, with
all the symbols of sovereignty, but Rabin did not live long
enough to deal with the matter. Rabin also repeatedly stated
that Jerusalem would remain unified – another weighty issue
that was never tested.
Rabin (and Peres also) never truly clarified his position
regarding the core issues of the conflict, or how the permanent
agreement should be resolved. The only exception to this was
the steadfast policy against the Palestinian "right of return",
as there was an almost total consensus on the Israeli side on
this issue. However, it does not seem that this lack of clarity
influenced the process during this initial stage (until Rabin's
assassination and Netanyahu's rise to power).
First and foremost, it was the terrorist attacks that undermined
public support for the peace process during that period, many
11 Ibid., p. 7.
