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Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
Chapter 1 – Historical background
The idea of the two-state solution was first conceived and
proposed in the conclusions of the Peel Commission in 1937.
From the onset, this proposal provoked strong opposition both
from the Jewish and Arab parties, but it eventually became
the official policy of the Zionist and
Yishuv
(Jewish residents
in the land of Israel prior to the establishment of the State of
Israel) leadership.
From the late 1930s and throughout World War II, Britain
gradually lost its enthusiasm for the idea, and the war itself
dismissed the subject from the national and public agenda.
After the war, it again became a national issue with the
establishment of UNSCOP (the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine), and UN Resolution 181 (Partition
Plan) of November 29, 1947. At that point, the two-state
solution had already been accepted by the main faction
of the Yishuv leadership, as they saw the proposal as an
international sanction for establishing the Jewish state in the
Land of Israel after two millennia of exile.
On the two occasions in which the two-state solution was
raised as a concrete proposition, it was rejected in its entirety
by the Arabs, usually with shows of extreme violence: first, in
1937, with the renewal of the Arab revolt (although it should
be noted that such violent attacks also occurred previously
and with far more profound causes); and second, in 1947,
following the November 29, 1947 UN vote agreeing to the
partition (UN Resolution 181), signaling the outbreak of
the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. After the war (in fact, prior to its
conclusion), Palestinian factors had already lost their standing
in the international arena, and the issue of the Arab-Palestinian
state was barely considered until the Six Day War in 1967.
From 1949 (the signing of the Armistice Agreements in
Rhodes) to 1967, the issue was "addressed" by the Arab states,
each in accordance with their individual interests, although
the renewal of Palestinian national sentiment already took root
in the late '50s (with the founding of the Fatah movement),
and establishment of the PLO in 1964.
The 1967 Six Day War and IDF conquest of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip again raised the issue on Middle Eastern
and global agendas, refocusing attention on the idea of a
Palestinian state. While some supported a two-state solution,
others considered a one-state alternative. This produced
a "mirror image" effect ("Greater Israel" vs. a democratic
and secular state, or an Islamic state as desired by the
fundamentalist factions).
The issue was raised again in the 1979 Camp David Accords,
although never with the intention of establishing a Palestinian
state (certainly, not by Israel), and then again in the 1987
London Agreement. The outbreak of the First Intifada on
December 9, 1987 elevated the issue to a first priority on
all fronts – Israeli, Pan-Arab, Muslim and international.
Subsequently, and as a direct outcome of these events,
several additional developments unfolded:
• King Hussein's decision regarding the Jordanian
disengagement from the West Bank in July 1988.
• The PNC's decision and Arafat's acceptance of UN
Security Council Resolution 242 and two-state solution
on October 1988.
• US agreement to commence official dialogue with PLO and
willingness to extend an invitation to its representatives
to the international peace conference held on December
1988 to resolve the conflict.
These factors, along with the circumstances resulting from
the First Gulf War (the international coalition that also included
Middle Eastern countries, and the Israeli policy of restraint to
ensure it did not collapse despite the barrage of Scud missiles
from Iraq that landed in Israel), prompted the US government,
led by President George Bush and Secretary of State Baker,
to the understanding that a "window of opportunity" had
been created in the Middle East. This "window" could be
used to promote regional peace, while also addressing the
Palestinian issue, thus initiating the Madrid Conference on
October 3, 1991.
Despite being "dragged" to the conference by intense pressure
from the US, Israel sent its most senior ranking delegation,
headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and took active
part in the discussions, although with a considerable number
of reservations. Notwithstanding Israel's reticence, this
conference did establish several practices and official lines
of communication that would later serve in all avenues used
during the peace process, both bilateral and multilateral.
Although the Palestinians did not participate as an independent
delegation (arriving as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation), the process begun there paved the way to direct
negotiations and mutual recognition between Israel and the
PLO, and then to the Oslo Accords on September 1993.
The Oslo Accords, originally meant to serve as the starting
point of an ongoing process, is a seminal event in the sequence
of (mostly secret) meetings held throughout November
1992 to September 13, 1993, the day on which the signing
ceremony of the Declaration of Principles was held on the
White House lawn.
***
The bilateral andmultilateral relations between Israel and each
of its neighboring countries has always provoked opposition,
Yossi Hen
Spoilers on the Way
to a Two-State Solution
