19
I believe this is an understandable but realistically untenable
position. The Palestinian leadership has a vested interest in
convincing the international community, not to pursue the
paradigm of "end of conflict", but to seek a most pragmatic
paradigm, for which they possess sufficient legitimacy
to come to terms with Israel, and bring about the "end
of occupation." Abbas and/or his successor have all the
necessary legitimacy internally, regionally and internationally,
to ask for a territorial agreement that will end occupation
and establish a contiguous and not a truncated Palestinian
State. Evidently this will have to be achieved in such a way,
as to take care of Israel's essential political and security
interests, in a controlled process, necessary to reach good
neighborly relations.
If Abbas and/or his successor will sustain the "everything
or nothing" approach, I am afraid that Palestinian rejection
will be eventually perceived by the international community
as recipe leading to a continued stalemate, causing hereby
passive support to incitement, or worse, involvement in terror.
This is a dangerous fault line the Palestinian Authority might
not want to trespass. It would repeat the mistake of 1990-
1991, when Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein's aggression
against Kuwait, and against a widely united coalition of the
international community and most Arab states.
Only rejectionist tendencies of a right wing Israeli government
might save the Palestinians from being held responsible for
trespassing the fault line between those countries opposing
terror, and those passively or actively supporting it.
A constructive Israeli governmental policy committing to
gradual and controlled progress toward a peaceful Israel-
Palestine two-state solution, living in good neighborly relations
one beside the other, would make a change of the present
rejectionist approach of President Abbas untenable and
vice versa, a pragmatic approach of President Abbas would
leave Netanyahu with no excuse not to move forward on the
path toward a peaceful two state solution.
4. The International Community: Policy Requirements
and Repercussions
There are voices among the international community who
tend to ignore the remark of Albert Einstein that when an
experiment has failed four to five times, repeating it another
time is senseless. These voices tend to stick to the concept
of "everything or nothing" and still advocate the paradigm
of solving all outstanding core issues of conflict, in order
to reach a commitment on "end of conflict" and "finality of
claims". In doing so, they keep both the Palestinian and
the Israeli leadership in the "comfort zone" of maintaining
a rejectionist policy. For internal political reasons, this has
advantages for Prime Minister Netanyahu on one side,
who can claim that "the world is all against us" and pose as
the sole defendant of Israel's inalienable rights. And it has
similar political advantages for President Abbas, as he can
maintain his position of "everything or nothing".
As a matter of fact the recent Quartet statement of July 1, 2016
48
has made an effort to get both the Israeli and Palestinian
leadership out of their comfort zone, and made essential
preliminary demands to introduce political change on both
sides of the divide: demanding the Palestinian Authority to
stop incitement, and demanding Israel to change drastically
the settlement policy and the preclusion of Palestinian
development in Area C.
Further action of the international community should involve:
• Develop in a dialogue with the parties a gradual approach
towards the achievement of a two-state solution.
• Encourage the parties to work out understandings in
regard to territory, settlements security, economic and
civilian state-to-state relations, on the basis of "what has
been agreed upon shall be implemented."
• Assist the parties to develop together with the neighboring
Arab states an effective "control and command" structure
to fight against all forms of violence, incitement and
terrorism.
• Mobilize regional and wider international support for
creating an independent physical infrastructure of the
emerging Palestinian State, coordinated with Israel in
order to create supportive conditions for good neighborly
relations. This should definitely include a commitment to
the indivisibility of the West Bank and Gaza, as integral
parts of the State of Palestine. In dealing politically with
Gaza it will be essential to develop a fully coordinated
position between the Government of Israel, the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah, the Government of Egypt and obtain
further support from Saudi Arabia, other Arab Gulf States
(with the exception of Qatar) and Jordan.
• Define in agreement with the parties, an effective
international oversight mechanism, to hold the parties
responsible for implementation of commitments made.
In this context various approaches may be tested. On
security issues it may be advisable to permit the USSC
(United States Security Coordinator) to review progress
and work with the parties together in order to move
forward. Another option would be to create a joint working
group between Israel, the PA, Egypt and the United
States (as referred to in the Agreement of Movement
and Access of November 2005) to deal with security
issues. Regarding economic issues, the AHLC (Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee) may assert a well mandated review
function. Another option would be to create (in line with
the French Initiative) a joint committee, which would
report periodically to an agreed international forum. In
regard to the political process, the Quartet powers, (USA,
EU, Russia and the UN) will have to assert a reviewing,
supportive, and correctional role.
48 Report of the Middle East Quartet, July 1, 2016: see:
int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/report-middle-east-quartet-
july-1
