28
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
Security
coordination
Intelligence
sharing
Freedom of
movement for
Palestinians
Israel’s responsibilities
Palestinian
responsibilities
Phase
Expansion
to cover all
security issues
in the pilot area
Expansion
to cover all
terror activities
discovered in
the pilot area
Absolute freedom
of movement in the
pilot area. No need
to coordinate.
Discontinuation of IDF
military activity in pilot area,
excluding cases in which
such activity is essential
to prevent an immediate
security threat (“ticking
bomb”). The duration and
intensity of activity will be
maintained at as low a
level as possible to create
minimal disturbance to the
Palestinian population.
Authorization for activity will
be granted at the level of
the minister of defense.
Rehabilitation of the sector
security DCO and shared
offices.
Imposition of law and
order and stepping
up of counterterrorism
activity in the pilot
area.
The use of arms
is permitted in the
pilot area both to
enforce law and
order and to engage
in counterterrorism
activities.
The arms and
equipment of the
Palestinian forces
will be upgraded, i.e.
bulletproof vests, etc.
Phase
2
Expansion
of required
activities for
immediate
response and
hot pursuit
Transfer
of precise
intelligence
for immediate
response
against terror
Freedom of
movement for the
Palestinian forces in
agreed-upon routes
between the pilot
area and specific
security centers
Absence of military activity,
excluding cases of “ticking
bombs.”
Overall security and
civil responsibility lies
with the Palestinian
Authority in the pilot
area.
Phase
3
Building trust between the sides
The security element is a leading component guiding decision
makers in Israel when deciding whether Israel should give up
land for peace. In order to reach a permanent settlement, it is
necessary to restore confidence between the security agencies
of the two sides. In his article, “From Operation Cast Lead to a
Different Path,” Col. Gal Hirsch (his rank at the time of writing)
explains that he served as Central Command operations officer
at the time of the change in perception led by Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon, which viewed the PA as an adversary, and its
government as directly responsible for the acts of terrorism
and violence emanating from its territory. At this stage, the
IDF exerted pressure on the PA and its security agencies to
force them to fight terrorism, while refraining from negating
Palestinian sovereignty and subverting its civilian apparatuses.
8
The period following the Second Intifada saw a gradual
change in the attitude of Israeli security officials towards PA
security forces. A working relationship began to gradually take
shape again between the parties, in tandem with a process
involving the introduction of some of the fighting militias into
the apparatuses (the agreement regarding wanted terrorist
8 Gal Hirsch, “From Operation Cast Lead to a different path – The
development of the campaign in the Central Command 2000-2003,”
Maarchot, February 2004, pp. 28-29.
operatives). The security coordination passed a number of
significant tests, and Israeli security officials declared on more
than one occasion that this coordination is a cornerstone of
stability in the West Bank. However, the change in question
has not yet penetrated the consciousness of Israel’s politicians
or general public, which continue to consider Palestinian
security officials as hostile elements that cannot be relied
upon at the current time, or as part of a future settlement.
In the context of the negotiations on security arrangements
in the Annapolis process, it became clear that negotiators
on behalf of Israel were working from a position of mistrust
towards the Palestinians, specifically regarding their ability to
indeed maintain the security perimeter and demilitarization of a
Palestinian state. The Palestinians, on the other hand, viewed
this as an attempt to coerce Israeli presence in Palestinian
state territories and continue the occupation by other means.
9
In order to reach an agreement, the decision makers and
Israeli public will have to be convinced that the transfer
of security responsibility to PA forces will not undermine
Israel’s security, and that the power given to them will not
be directed against Israel in the event of a change in the
Palestinian government. The foundation stone in the trust-
9 Omer Tzanani, The Anapolis Process: Oasis or Mirage? Pp. 98-99,
2015
