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building process needed on the Israeli side is to bolster
Israeli conviction that the Palestinians are indeed able and
motivated to abide by a signed agreement. That is why it is
necessary to engage in a process of strengthening security
ties between PA forces and the IDF and Israel’s intelligence
agencies, despite the reluctance among both the Palestinian
and Israeli publics to take action of this nature, and despite
the limitations dictated by continuing the current situation, in
which the IDF’s principal responsibility is to protect the Israeli
population in the West Bank.
We must explore how to leverage the security coordination so
that it serves to strengthen the confidence of the Israeli and
Palestinian publics regarding the necessity of coordination,
and illustrate how it serves the interests of each party. For
example, for the Israeli side this could be the returning of
Israelis who accidentally cross over into Area
A by PA security officials, or safeguarding
the security of Jewish worshipers who come
to worship at Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus. For
the Palestinian side, strengthening security
cooperation with Israel in a reality in which
there is no political process is an almost
impossible task. The fact that Abu Mazen’s
leadership is dependent on the loyalty of
the PA’s security apparatuses means that
he needs to find the right way to preserve
the legitimacy of security force activities
without being perceived as collaborating
with Israel. Hamas exploits this weakness,
publishing virulent criticism of any security
coordination with Israel on its media and
social networks. Security coordination and
expansion of the authority of the Palestinian
police in Area B will make it possible to
strengthen Palestinians’ personal security,
and enhance the level of services that the
government provides to its citizens. At the
same time, improving the effectiveness of
the actions taken by the PA’s security forces
against Hamas operatives, particularly
in a way that serves both Palestinian
leadership and Israel, can strengthen
the trust between the sides, prevent
escalation and ensure quiet, all of which are
prerequisites for any round of negotiations.
Security coordination with Gaza
Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007,
there has been no communications between
the Palestinian security forces in Gaza (which
are under the absolute control of Hamas)
and Israel. These forces draw their salaries
from the PA, but do not bend to its authority,
meaning that in practice Gaza and the West
Bank maintain two separate, parallel security
bodies. Many ideas have been raised by
the international community to propose an
agreement for the entry of PA security forces into Gaza in
the last decade. Most of these ideas have taken the position
that PA security forces can be brought to man the crossings
and seam zone between Gaza and Egypt (the Philadelphi
Route). However, thus far the Hamas and PA have failed to
reach any agreement between them on the subject. The
assumption that holding onto the Gaza perimeter will help
the PA to gradually retake control of Gaza is not a realistic
one. The Hamas will not voluntarily dismantle its military
capability, and consequently, it appears that the inclusion
of Gaza in the interim agreements for the expansion of the
Palestinian authority will not be possible. At the same time,
it is in the IDF’s interest to achieve a balance of deterrence
and unwritten understandings with Hamas that will create a
security situation desirable to Israel.
