22
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
Introduction
This paper will attempt to point to the factors that both
help and hinder progress towards the two-state solution,
exploring the issue through the prism of security. Ensuring
the security of Israeli citizens is a sine qua non for all Israeli
leaders, and a prerequisite for any progress towards the
two-state solution. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority
contends with internal criticism because of its difficulty in
providing personal security for its citizens. Since the signing
of the Interim Agreements in 1995, security issues have
been the key factor in shaping political reality. The Second
Intifada (2000-2004) and the violent struggles that periodically
erupted both before and after it have had a crucial impact
on the degree to which the parties have been able to enter
negotiations and mobilize public support for the idea of two
states. Mapping the conditions that enable or hinder security
may help foster an understanding of how to move forward
toward a permanent solution. The complex dynamics and
internal processes experienced by the two peoples, as well
as the involvement of the international community, have had
a profound impact on the development of conditions that
make negotiations possible. Based on past experience, it
is clear that situations involving escalation and confrontation
impede progress towards a solution, even if the parties are
in the midst of negotiations. Furthermore, extremists on both
sides are aware of this, and consequently try to sabotage the
negotiations by attempting to divert the parties onto the path
of violent confrontation. These “spoilers” are well aware that
negotiators depend on public support, and will do whatever
they can to employ public opinion to disrupt negotiations
and cause them to fail.
Palestinian security apparatuses
In accordance with the interim agreements (Oslo), the
Palestinian Authority maintains several security forces that
are not quite on the level of an army, but which can engage in
law enforcement and contend with issues of internal security.
The Palestinian security forces consist of seven main
apparatuses:
1. The National Security Force (NSF) – This is the infrastructure
for the Palestinian military force. Its mission is to maintain
internal security and the stability of the regime.
2. The Civil Police – This is the central apparatus for the
maintenance of law and order. Its main role is to address
the needs of the local population. With about 8000 police
officers, the Civil Police Force is the largest and most
modern of the PA’s security forces. It fights crime, enforces
traffic laws, engages in patrols, and reinforces other
security units.
3. The Preventive Security Service – This is an apparatus for
gathering intelligence within the Palestinian Authority. The
Preventive Security Service focuses on fighting Hamas
and other opposition elements in the West Bank.
4. The Presidential Guard (Force 17) – The Presidential
Guard is directly subordinate to Abbas, and its role is to
provide security for the Chairman and other senior PA
officials. However, the Presidential Guard is also frequently
used to fight Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Numbering
about 5000 soldiers, the Presidential Guard is also used
to subdue protests.
5. The General Intelligence Service – This is an intelligence-
gathering apparatus that acts outside the territories of the
PA. It numbers about 4000.
6. Military Intelligence (MI) – MI is responsible for internal
security in the security apparatuses.
7. Emergency Services and Rescue (Civil Defense) – These
are subordinate to the PA Chairman.
1
Security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian
security forces
The Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians
signed on September 28 1995 attributed great importance to
security cooperation between the IDF and Palestinian forces,
as reflected in the “Protocol on Redeployment and Security
Arrangements.”
2
The relationship between the IDF and the
Palestinian security forces in the West Bank has seen ups
and downs, notably a number of phases: The
first phase
from 1995 to the Western Wall tunnel events in September
1996 – trust building. At this stage, the parties began to
build trust and successful cooperation, and to engage in
high-level implementation of the rules as detailed in the
security protocol. The
second phase
– the Western Wall
tunnel events were a crisis point, as this was the first time
members of the Palestinian security forces opened fire on
IDF soldiers, taking a toll in IDF lives. From this point forward,
the Central Command headed by Gen. Moshe Yaalon took
an approach that required the IDF to prepare for a possible
all-out confrontation between the parties, although the security
coordination mechanisms remained in effect, albeit burdened
by increasing mutual suspicion. The third phase began with
the eruption of the Second Intifada in September 2000, and
even more so with the launch of Operation Defensive Shield
1 T. Croitoru, “Timeout in Judea and Samaria,” Maarchot 445, October
2012, p. 44.
2 See:
Ron Shatzberg
Factors that Help / Enable Progress towards
a Two-State Solution – The Security Area
