17
initiate the concept of Unilateral Disengagement.
41
In seeking
to move forward on the way toward an Israel-Palestine two-
state solution, it is essential to extract from each one of these
attempts, elements that both parties need in order to agree.
A decisive enabling condition for success is to prevent
failure to turn into despair, but rather turn failure and the
related suffering into determination and hope. Optimally
this is the task of leadership. As a backstop this is the task
of civil society.
Defining (Accurately) the Zone of Possible Agreement
An obvious precondition enabling leaders and negotiators to
define the Zone of Possible Agreement is to have an in-depth
understanding of all issues of disagreement. In preparing the
Oslo concept I received from Hana Siniora, who in 1985, had
been appointed by Arafat as possible negotiator, a detailed
description of the diverging Israeli and Palestinian positions
on each issue related to the self-government negotiations.
42
As both Rabin and Arafat perceived the establishment
of Palestinian self-government as both a separate and a
shared interest, headway was possible. Understanding the
difficulties offered a way forward by adopting the principle
of gradualism; i.e. moving forward step-by-step in a well-
controlled and pre-described process.
While seeking a two-state solution, a majority of Israelis and a
majority of Palestinians will tend to agree that the creation of
a successful, prosperous, responsible and contiguous State
of Palestine is potentially a shared interest. In this context,
the question the negotiators ask provides a key to identifying
the Zone of Possible Agreement. If the question asked is:
How can all core issues of conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians be solved? – Experience has shown that there
is no Zone of Possible Agreement. However, if the question
asked is: How can a successful, prosperous Palestinian
state be established that will live in good neighborly relations
with Israel and its other neighbors? – A substantial Zone of
Possible Agreement can be identified.
Identifying the Deal-Making Element for Both Sides
The Oslo negotiations were successful, as the deal-making
elements were identified mostly at the beginning. For Arafat,
the decisive dealmaker was the offer to return from Tunis
to historical Palestine, as well as the willingness of Israel
to recognize the PLO. For Rabin, the decisive dealmaker
was the concept of gradualism, which permitted the Israeli
government to maintain effective control mechanisms, i.e.
the source of authority, and maintain the civil administration,
and the military government (which according to the Camp
David Accords was meant to be withdrawn).
I argue that similar dealmakers can now be identified in the
effort to move forward toward a two-state solution. President
Abbas and the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and
41 See Dov Weissglas, Arik Sharon –Rosh-Hamemshala – Mabat Ishi
(Sharon-A Prime Minister) Tel Aviv, Yedioth Ahronot, 2012.
42 Hana Siniora's document is printed in Hirschfeld op.cit. pp.102-
103.
Gaza need an irreversible commitment of Israel for reaching
a two-state solution. Thus, such an Israeli commitment, in
the form of phased recognition of the State of Palestine,
enabling negotiations to be pursued between two states –
with no recognized border between them, has the potential
to become a dealmaker, leading to full recognition, when
agreement on territory and the border shall be achieved.
Prime Minister Netanyahu or any other Israeli leader will need
in return, as Rabin did, to maintain control mechanisms of
an envisaged process.
In order to support such an approach both sides will need
substantial political, security, economic, technical and moral
support from the international community, and even more
so, from the Arab states in the region.
2. What to Do Differently?
The Need to Manage Expectations Realistically
In trying to sell the Oslo Agreement to the Israeli public, Rabin
and Peres oversold it, claiming that they had achieved a
peace agreement, which the Oslo Accords never were. The
Oslo Accords described an agreed process how to pursue
a common search for conflict resolution. Benny Begin, in an
interview to Connie Bruck in 1996, clearly indicated that this
mistake would make it possible for the Likud to effectively
oppose the Oslo Concept.
43
In the present context it would be a mistake to argue that
headway in the peace process will end terrorist attacks and
thus create personal security to Israel's citizens. The likelihood
that Iran will instigate terror acts, that ISIS, various jihadist
groups, Hezbollah and Hamas will try to do so – mainly in
order to stop the peace-finding process, or that individual
acts of terror will continue, is very high.
Expectations can be tuned down to realistic aims,
strengthening the Jewish-democratic identity of Israel;
improving relations with neighboring countries; overcoming
trade boycotts, andmost important creating security alliances
and a joint regional and international struggle against terror.
The Need to Create an Effective Policy against Spoilers
Rabin's slogan that he would fight terrorism, as if there
were no peace negotiations, and he would pursue peace
negotiations, as if there was no terror, was a mistake. The
outcome of this approach was detrimental on two accounts:
First, the continuing and escalating acts of terrorism brought
about a dwindling of popular support for Prime Minister
Rabin, contributing to the public atmosphere that led to his
assassination. Second, the commitment to negotiate in spite
of Palestinian terror acts created neither a stick nor a carrot
incentive for Arafat to take effective action against Palestinian
terrorism. Under present conditions, Israeli-Palestinian
security coordination alone, is not good enough, as the
Palestinian Authority even together with Israel, is not capable
to stop terrorist acts, which plague the entire region, as well
43 See Connie Bruck, TheWounds of Peace, The New Yorker, November
14, 1996.
