9
Prime Minister Begin and his Likud party similarly opposed
the creation of a Palestinian state. In signing the Camp
David Accords, Begin insisted, and received President
Carter's agreement, to refer to the West Bank as "Judea
and Samaria", hereby clearly maintaining the claim for
Jewish sovereignty over these areas. But not only the
Likud, also the Israeli Labor Party initially opposed the
idea of creating the State of Palestine. Shimon Peres, in
his memoirs Battling for Peace, wrote:
"In our view, a Palestinian state, though demilitarized at
first, would over time inevitably strive to build up a military
strength of its own, and the international community,
depending uponmassive Second and ThirdWorld support
at the United Nations, would do nothing to stop it. That
army, eventually, would be deployed at the very gates of
Jerusalem and down the entire, narrow length of Israel.
It would pose a constant threat to our security and to the
peace and stability of the region."
14
Many senior members of Israel's security establishment
shared Peres's views. Among them was Israeli army
commander Ariel Sharon. In his view, during the 1970s
and 1980s, Jordan should become the state of the
Palestinian people.
Yitzhak Rabin was ideologically closest to supporting a
"territorial solution". In the early 1970s he once remarked
that he would be willing to travel to Gush Etzion - an area
in the West Bank south of Bethlehem - with his passport
and by obtaining a visa. Nevertheless, Rabin was still
hesitant to openly declare his support for a two-state
solution. In a speech to the Knesset in October 1995, he
pointed out his objections to the formation of the State
of Palestine. He envisaged the creation of a Jordanian-
Palestinian confederation rather than a fully independent
State of Palestine. He insisted that the Jordan River should
remain Israel's security border and the settlements within
settlement blocs should be annexed to Israel, while others
could stay where they were situated. Accordingly he also
rejected a return to the June 4, 1967, cease-fire lines.
Last but not least, he insisted on maintaining the unity
of the city of Jerusalem.
15
The position of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was
similarly hostile to the PLO and to the creation of the
State of Palestine, as it was understood at the time (until
July 1988) that a Palestinian State would question and
undermine the existence of the Kingdom of Jordan. King
Hussein also feared that the Jordanian army "would
fracture along Palestinian-Jordanian lines".
16
Henry
Kissinger describes the Jordanian position as follows:
14 Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace – A Memoir; ed. David Landau
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995; pp. 352-353.
15 Yitzhak Rabin, speech to the Knesset, October 5, 1995;
.
mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1995/pages/pm%20rabin%20in%20
knesset%20ratification%20of%interim%20agree.aspx
16 Hussein has been quoted of saying this; see Avi Shlaim, Lion of
Jordan – The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace; Penguin
Books, London 2007; p.312.
"Jordan's position was perhaps the most complex. Each
Arab state proclaimed its devotion to the Palestinian
cause, partly out of conviction, partly to carry favor with
the radical trend in the area. ...Every Arab leader was
in a position to play this game except our friend King
Hussein. A Palestinian state could be formed only at the
expense of Jordan's previous position in Palestine…and
indeed its genesis (of a Palestinian state) would mark
the opening of a struggle over the very existence of the
Hashemite state east of the Jordan River. Leaders of the
PLO had avowed frequently enough that the blood feud
with Hussein was even deeper than that with Israel."
17
The logical conclusion of this state of affairs for the
American leadership, for the Hashemite kingdom, and
for the leadership of the Israeli Labor Party, was to seek
– along the lines of the Camp David Accords – an Israeli-
Jordanian agreement. This was actually achieved in April
1987, by signing the "London Agreement" between Shimon
Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein.
18
However, Israel’s
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir rejected the agreement.
19
Several months later, in December of 1987, the intifada,
a Palestinian rebellion, started, eventually empowering
the PLO and weakening Jordan's influence in the West
Bank and Gaza.
20
b. The Unfolding of Change in Support of the Two-State
Concept
Change towards the acceptance of the PLO, and herewith
of the concept of establishing a Palestinian State occurred
at first during 1988, mainly by two consecutive and inter-
related events: At the end of July 1988, King Hussein
disengaged Jordan from the West Bank and Gaza and left
a void that could only be filled by the PLO.
21
Following this
Jordanian move, US Secretary of State, George Shultz,
initiated with the assistance of Swedish foreign minister
Sten Andersson an indirect dialogue with the PLO. The
US demand of the PLO to accept UN Security Council
Resolution 242, providing for the principle of territory for
peace had now become acceptable to the Palestinians.
It meant that if a Palestinian delegation were to negotiate
with Israel, sooner or later Israel would have to withdraw
from the West Bank and Gaza, in return for peace. This
would make the establishment of a Palestinian state
feasible. Arafat also – at least nominally – accepted the
other two demands of the US: to recognize the right of
existence of the State of Israel and to renounce terror.
The next day, December 14, 1988, the United States
17 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval; Little Brown, Boston, Toronto
1982; p.748. the italics are quoted from Kissinger.
18 See Shlaim op.cit. pp. 440-447.
19 Ibid.
20 See Yair Hirschfeld, Track Two Diplomacy toward an Israeli-Palestinian
Solution, 1978-2014; Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; 2014; pp. 57-62.
21 See Shlaim op.cit. pp. 453-477.
