10
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
announced that a dialogue with the PLO would begin, led
by the American ambassador to Tunis, Robert Pelletreau.
22
King Hussein's decision to disengage from the West Bank
and Gaza, and replace Jordan's initial opposition to an
Israel-Palestine two-state solution, by favoring such an
outcome, was a seminal development. The logic guiding
the Jordanian action was altogether simple. It meant
that the Jordanian national interest was to solidify the
Jordanian identity, and in return give up territory. The
establishment of a Palestinian state West of Jordan would
permit the Palestinian people to exercise their right to
self-determination, and ease the Jordanian-Palestinian
relationship on the East Bank of the Jordan River. More
so, the Palestinian elite in Jordan, which largely controls
the Jordanian economy, continue to have a vested interest
in the stability of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. A
Palestinian state, if it aimed at becoming successful and
prosperous, needed to develop good neighborly relations
with both Israel and Jordan, coordinate security affairs
and develop its economy by promoting close relations
with both neighbors.
It took the leadership of the Israeli Labor Party several
years to think in similar terms. Israel's identity as a Jewish
and democratic state tended to overrule the need for
territorial control of the West Bank and Gaza, under the
condition that security arrangements could be made
to prevent Palestine from becoming an irredentist state
that would harbor aggressive military and/or terrorist
activities against Israel. When, following the conclusion
of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, in September 1993,
the way for signing an Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement
was opened, and peace was actually signed, accepting
a Palestinian State had become acceptable. In May
1997 the Israeli Labor Party platform advocated the
establishment of a Palestinian state, besides Israel. The
Palestinian right to self-determination was recognized,
and the establishment of a Palestinian state with "limited
sovereignty" was "not being excluded". The Israel Labor
Party platform of 2006, was more forthcoming and spoke
of the establishment of a Palestinian state, and demanded
the lease of settlements in settlement blocs, in order to
solve the settlement issue.
23
On Israel's right wing, opposition toward a two-state
solution was still strong. However, it was gradually,
though partially and slowly, eroding. In January 1997,
the "National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on
the Permanent Status Settlement with the Palestinians"
was concluded between Yossi Beilin on “the left”, and
with Michael Eitan of Likud, David Levy of Gesher, and
Rafael Eitan of Tzomet on “the right”. There was no
acceptance for the establishment of an independent
State of Palestine, but a commitment to the need "to
22 See Hirschfeld op.cit, pp. 59-60.
23 See in regard to the 1997 and the 2006 ILP policy platform: www.
jewishviruallibrary.org/jsource/politics/laborplatform.htm
permit the establishment of a Palestinian entity whose
status will be determined in negotiations."
24
All these activities prepared the way for Ehud Barak to
seek a two-state solution in negotiations with Chairman
Arafat, an effort that failed at the end of January 2001
(for discussion on the reasons, see below).
Nevertheless, the concept of a two-state solution, received
substantial reinforcement from two most relevant and
important actors:
InMarch 2002, the Arab Summit meeting in Beirut adopted
the Saudi proposed Arab Peace Initiative, which in its
essence subscribed to a peaceful Israel-Palestine two-
state solution. The central sentence read:
"(The) Initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from
all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and
338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and
the land for peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of
an independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem
as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal
relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with
Israel."
25
President Bush’s Rose Garden Speech followed this in
June 2002, where the United States adopted the concept
of a peaceful Israel-Palestine two-state solution. Whereas
the concept of a peaceful Israel-Palestine two-state
solution was identical with the concept advocated by the
Arab Peace Initiative, the suggested enabling conditions
were substantially different. The key elements of President
Bush's speech read:
"My vision is two-states living side by side in peace and
security… There is simply no way to achieve that peace
until all parties fight terror…When the Palestinian people
have new leaders, new institutions and new security
arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of
America will support the creation of a Palestinian state
whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will
be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement
in the Middle East."
26
24 Hirschfeld op.cit. p. 196. The content of this Agreement between
members of the Israeli peace camp and right wing parties did not
become a platform for joint action. However, most politicians who
signed the agreement, and particularly the two parties Gesher
and Tzomet, disengaged from their coalition with Likud under
Netanyahu's leadership and hereby contributed to Ehud Barak's
election victory of May 1999.
25 Quoted from Appendix 4 The Arab Peace Initiative Adopted at the
Beirut Arab Summit, March 2002; in: Marwan Muasher The Arab
Center – The Promise of Moderation; Yale University Press, New
Haven and London 2008; p. 281. Marwan Muasher, being Jordan's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, played a leading role in preparing the
Arab Peace Initiative (and later also the Benchmarked Roadmap
for Peace in the Middle East) describes the political and diplomatic
activity in preparing the Arab Peace Initiative. See: ibid. pp.102-133.
26 See: Full text of George Bush's speech on Israel and Palestine,
.
