16
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
the Israeli demand to recognize Israel as the state of
the Jewish people.
On the Israeli side, the unrealistic promise to achieve
"end of conflict" was offered to explain what most Israelis
perceived as far-reaching concessions. The "end of
conflict" concept created the need for a destructive
"everything or nothing" approach that has repeatedly
ended with "nothing", leaving any agreement dependent
on solving all outstanding core issues of conflict.
Probably even worse, the "end of conflict" concept in
substance sustained the slogan that "President Abbas
was no partner". True enough, he was and is no partner for
an "end of conflict" and "everything or nothing" approach,
which ruled out other options of moving towards a two-
state solution, an approach which interests both sides.
3.
The Danger of Underestimating the "Price for Peace"
Aiming to deal with all outstanding core issues of conflict,
the "price for peace" both sides have to pay remained
substantial. The Palestinian refugees were in essence
asked to give up their right of returning to their former
homes; the Israeli settlers were asked to give up their
dream of residing in Judea and Samaria and fulfilling
what they believed was God's demand. On security
issues, the Palestinians were asked to give up substantial
components of their own sovereignty, while Israel was
asked to withdraw from territories that offered a certain
strategic depth for the defense of Israel's population
centers between Ashqelon and Haifa, which would be
vulnerable to attack if violence recurred. Failure became
a foregone conclusion as long as those groups, who had
the most to lose by a Permanent Status Agreement, were
neither brought on board, nor effectively marginalized.
4.
The tendency of the Peace Negotiators to Ignore the
Religious Leadership on Both Sides
In 2006, the Spanish Government organized a 15-year
anniversary of the Madrid Conference. At that occasion,
the Israeli and Palestinian delegations were invited to a
reception with the King and Queen of Spain who received
us graciously and after an initial speech mingled among
us. At the occasion, small snacks were served, including
various forms of pork and bacon. The problem was not
the faux pas of the Spanish Court; the problem was
rather the fact that neither the Palestinian nor the Israeli
negotiators, cared that the delicious snacks were neither
kosher, nor halal.
On both sides, Yossi Sarid on the Israeli side, and Yasser
Abed Rabbo on the Palestinian side, in referring to the
peace process, raised the flag of secularism and hereby
tended to alienate a majority of Israelis and Palestinians
who cherished strong religious and traditional sentiments.
The four issues discussed represent the major strategic
reasons that have caused the repeated failure of
negotiations. In addition, many tactical mistakes were
made, which have to be avoided in future negotiations.
38
V. The Enabling Conditions to Promote
an Israel-Palestine Two-State Solution
In order to identify the enabling conditions, particularly for
Israel, but also for the Palestinians, it is useful to review
experience gained during the Oslo negotiations and compare,
what to do and what to do differently.
1. What to Do?
Understanding the "Need" for Fifteen Years of Failure:
When the European Union commissioned me to write a
research paper, which eventually became the blue-print for
the Oslo negotiations,
39
I had had the privilege of learning
the lessons from fourteen years of failed negotiation attempts
– aimed at defining an agreement on Palestinian self-
government. This experience led to success. One should
remember Churchill's sarcastic remark saying that "American
foreign policy would always be rationale, but only after all
other alternatives have been exhausted". In negotiations
aiming to overcome particularly prolonged conflicts, the
process of testing possible "irrational" outcomes is almost
obligatory, as each side wants to obtain the optimal outcome.
Only after having tested various options that do not work,
and extracting from each of them, one or more constructive
elements, is it possible to define and reach achievable
common ground.
After the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978, we
experienced repeated failures. The attempt to reach an
agreement in Israeli-Egyptian negotiations failed at the end
of 1981; President Reagan's Peace Proposal of September
1982 failed; another attempt to reach an Israeli-Jordanian
understanding by concluding the London Agreement of 1987
also failed; so did the attempt to reach an understanding with
the Palestinian "inside" leadership, first in 1989-90, and again
during the Washington talks after the Madrid Conference.
However, important elements of each attempt were adopted
in the concept that was finally concluded and agreed upon.
Aiming to reach an Israel-Palestine two-state solution today,
we again have the privilege of being able to learn from
repeated failures: Seeking an end of conflict agreement
failed repeatedly; the concept of the "Performance-Based
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution in the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict" similarly failed.
40
So did the attempt to
38 For a discussion of tactical mistakes, see Hirschfeld, chapters
seven, eight and nine.
39 Yair Hirschfeld, Israel, the Palestinians and the Middle East: From
Dependency to Interdependence; September 1992; unpublished
policy paper; the content of the paper is being summed up in
Hirschfeld op.cit. pp. 100-106.
40 For the text see Muasher op.cit. pp.283-290; for a description of the
diplomatic activities and the motivation in developing the concept
of the Roadmap see: ibid. chapter five, pp. 134-175.
