14
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
national Palestinian interest and as such has proven to
be guardedly sustainable. Second, additional Palestinian
state-building efforts have to be promoted both top-down
and a bottom-up. Top-down means that coordination and
agreement with Israel is essential, as most vital Israeli
interests are involved in almost every Palestinian move.
Bottom-up means that substantial change has to be
achieved on the ground that will create mutual trust, as
well as legitimacy for necessary political concessions on
both sides. Third, substantial regional and international
support and oversight functions are essential.
IV. Why Did Negotiations Seeking a
Permanent Status Agreement Fail
Repeatedly?
1. Five Failures
Since the conclusion of the Oslo Accords, attempts to reach
an Israel-Palestine Permanent Status Agreement that would
include "end of conflict" and "finality of claims" failed five times:
The first attempt was the "Beilin-Abu Mazen Understanding",
which was concluded on October 31, 1995, five days before
the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. I played a leading role
in the negotiations under the oversight of Yossi Beilin and
the support of Ron Pundak. Today I am convinced it was the
biggest mistake I have ever made, as the paper created the
illusion that an "end of conflict" agreement was attainable.
Several weeks before we concluded the Understanding, on
September 11, 1995, I attended a meeting with Chairman
Arafat, together with the former chef de cabinet of Chancellor
Kreisky, Ferdinand Lacina. At the meeting Arafat turned to
me and remarked that the Permanent Status issues were too
difficult and too complex to deal with.
30
He gave a similar
warning to Yossi Beilin.
31
When Permanent Status negotiations
got to a critical stage, in September 2000, Abbas publicly
renounced the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understanding. At the time
Palestinian demands went most substantially beyond of what
had been agreed in October 1995, which made it evident that
the "Understanding" was not worth the paper it was written on.
32
Arafat, maintained a consequent position, asking either
for a total Israeli acceptance of all Palestinian demands,
in order – possibly – to commit to "end of conflict",
33
or as
an alternative he suggested a phased approach. Already
several years earlier, during the first premiership of Netanyahu,
Arafat refused to negotiate a Permanent Status Agreement.
In the summer of 2000 Arafat asked Israel to accept the
proclamation of the State of Palestine; to carry out a Further
30 Hirschfeld op.cit. p.375, footnote 113.
31 Ibid. pp.176-177
32 Ibid. p. 245.
33 Arafat met Clinton April 20, 2000. We received a read out of the
meeting, which in many ways was pathetic and a dialogue of the
deaf. Clinton told Arafat that what was on the table was "everything
or nothing" and accordingly Arafat laid out demands that no Israeli
government could accept in their entirety. See ibid. pp. 232-233.
Redeployment of 11 %, giving Palestine de facto control over
51% of the West Bank territory and establishing a Palestinian
municipality in the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem. In
regard to the territorial issue, Arafat was willing to commit
to negotiate the final outcome, while agreeing to disagree
on the final outcome, permitting the Palestinians to claim
the June 4 cease-fire line as a temporary border.
34
Prime
Minister Barak did not accept these conditions and thus the
second attempt to reach a Permanent Status Agreement in
the aftermath of Camp David, in September 2000, failed.
35
On December 23, 2000, President Clinton submitted to both
the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams, what became
known as the "Clinton Parameters". Arafat rejected them and
Clinton commented:
"…I still had no idea what Arafat was going to do. His body
language said no, but the deal was so good I could not believe
anyone would be foolish enough to let it go. Barak wanted
me to come to the region, but I wanted Arafat to say yes to
the Israelis on the big issues embodied in my parameters
first… Finally, Arafat agreed to see Shimon Peres… Nothing
came of it. As a backstop, the Israelis tried to produce a letter
with as much agreement on the parameters as possible, on
the assumption that Barak would lose the election and at
least both sides would be bound to a course that could lead
to an agreement. Arafat wouldn't even do that because he
didn't want to be seen conceding anything."
36
Similarly the third attempt at Taba, at the end of January
2001, failed.
Olmert's peace proposal of September 2008 met the same
fate. The Palestinian claim that it was a "take it or leave it
proposal" is not exact. Olmert after the initial rejection sent
Ron Pundak to President Abbas, to ask for possible changes.
President Bush and Secretary of State Condolezza Rice,
asked Abbas to reconsider, but to no avail.
37
Finally, Secretary Kerry's attempts of 2013-14 added to the
long list of failures.
2. Understanding the Causes of Failure
Historically and politically the different approaches to reach a
two-state solution as prescribed by the Arab Peace Initiative
on one hand, and by President George Bush's Rose Garden
speech on the other, illustrates the fact that no common
approach as how to reach a two-state solution has yet been
34 This proposal of Arafat was given to me and Boaz Karni by Hanan
Ashrawi and was rejected by Barak. The same evening Arafat and
Barak met and the same idea was again proposed and rejected.
See: ibid. pp. 246-247.
35 The failure of the Camp David Summit had been predictable. On
the eve of the opening of the Camp David Conference I phoned
my sister and told her that Barak was jumping from an airplane
without a parachute. See: Hirschfeld op.cit. Chapter Seven: "The
March of Folly: Ehud Barak's Attempt to Conclude a Permanent
Status Agreement, May 1999-February 2001; pp. 221-260.
36 Bill Clinton, My Life, New York, Random House, 2005; p. 944.
37 Condolezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in
Washington; Random House, New York 2011; pp. 723-724.
