6
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
I. Introductory Remark: Four Questions
to be asked
On the first evening in Norway, January 20, 1993, when
the Oslo negotiations began, I told Abu Ala and the other
members of the PLO delegation, Maher el-Kurd and Hassan
Azfour, the following joke:
God had summoned the three most important leaders of the
world: President Bush (the father), Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr.
Shamir and told them that he – God – had made a mistake;
a meteor would in two weeks hit planet earth, and everybody
would die. And God added: "You have the privilege of telling
your people so that they can prepare and at least enjoy the
last two weeks of their lives." Accordingly, Gorbachev went
on air, in a speech to the Russian people and said: "I have
two bad news items to tell you. The first news item is that
there is a God; we hoped and believed that there was no
God and we were wrong. But the second news item is far
worse: we are all going to die in two weeks. Please, my dear
Russian people, prepare for it and enjoy your last days."
Then President Bush went on air, and said: "My dear American
people, I have one wonderful news item, and another bad
one. There is a God, and we rejoice in God. However, in two
weeks all of us will die. Please prepare."
Finally, Yizchak Shamir went on air, and said: "My dear Jewish
people, I have two wonderful news items. There is a God,
and we rejoice in God. The second news item is even better:
I can assure you there will never be a Palestinian State."
Abu Ala, Maher el-Kurd and Hassan Azfour were pleased
about the joke, as it clearly signalized that the intent of our
discussions would be to reach, one way or the other, a
peaceful Israel-Palestine two-state solution.
In this essay, I will refer to the following issues:
1. Why did I dare to indicate that the aim of the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations would be to reach a two-state
solution? Or in other words: why is it a mutual Israeli and
Palestinian interest to reach a two-state solution?
2. What progress on the way toward a two-state solution
has been made since 1993?
3. Why did negotiations aiming to reach a Permanent Status
Agreement fail repeatedly? And
4. What are the lessons learned and accordingly what are
the enabling conditions that have to be pursued in order
to proceed on the way to a peaceful Israel-Palestine
two-state solution?
II. The Mutual Israeli-Palestinian Interest
to Reach a Two-State Solution
The foundations for the negotiations in Norway were laid
almost fifteen years before the negotiations in Norway started
by the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, of September
17, 1978, which provided for a two phase process and
three time periods: first, an open-ended period to negotiate
the modalities for establishing an elected Palestinian self-
governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
second, a five-year transitional period to begin "when the
self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West
Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated";
1
and third,
negotiations that would take place "as soon as possible,
but not later than the third year after the beginning of the
transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship
with its neighbors …"
2
Listening to President Sadat's speech at the Knesset in
November 1977, it was clear that the Egyptian leader aimed
at promoting negotiations that would lead to a peaceful
Israeli-Palestine two-state solution. By negotiating the Camp
David Accords of 1978, Sadat laid the foundations for such
an outcome. Four provisions of the treaty made it evident
that the only possible outcome of negotiations would be a
two-state solution. These provisions were:
1. Negotiations on the "final status of the West Bank and
Gaza…shall be based on all the provisions and principles
of UN Security Council Resolution 242," which provided for
Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967.
2. If this was not clear enough, it was made evident that
withdrawal from territories "will resolve, among other
matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature
of security arrangements".
3. Israeli withdrawal and negotiations on borders will lead
to a solution that will "recognize the legitimate rights of
the Palestinian people and their just requirements", which
in Sadat's mind clearly referred to the Palestinian right
for self-determination; and
4. In order to ensure that the final outcome will be in line with
the wishes of the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza, the Camp David Accords (1978) obliged the
parties that "the agreement will have to be submitted to
1 See Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978;..
2 Ibid.
Yair Hirschfeld
Creating the Enabling Conditions for Reaching
an Israel-Palestine Two-State Solution
