7
a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants
of the West Bank and Gaza."
3
Anyone who read and understood the text of the Camp David
Accords could guess that the only outcome by a process of
negotiations would be either an agreement between Israel
and a Jordan-Palestine Confederation, to which King Hussein
and Chairman Arafat had committed in an agreement of
February 1985,
4
or if this would not be the case, would lead
to an Israel-Palestine two-state solution.
5
Therefore, most
former Heruth party Members of Knesset, who ideologically
opposed a renewed partition of Eretz Yisrael (the Land
of Israel), or the territory of the former British Mandate of
Palestine, and in particular the leading members Yitzchak
Shamir and Moshe Arens, either abstained or voted against
the Camp David Accords.
However, after thirteen years of failed negotiation efforts, it
was Prime Minister Shamir who agreed to the conditions of the
Madrid Conference; it was under his leadership that peace
negotiations between Israel and at first a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation started, and it was again under his
guidance that the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation split, and
Israel was negotiating with a purely Palestinian negotiating
team, dominated by the PLO, on how to implement the
provisions of the Camp David Accords of September 1978.
It was not merely the text of the Camp David Accords that
made it clear that the best outcome of negotiations would be
the establishment of an Israel-Palestine two-state solution.
More important, it appeared to be evident that both Israel,
its Jewish majority and its Arab minority, as well as the
entire Palestinian people, had a vested existential interest
in reaching a peaceful two-state solution.
In order for Israel to maintain its Jewish-democratic identity, it
remains essential to separate from the West Bank and Gaza.
The desire to maintain the Jewish-democratic identify of
Israel had influenced Ben Gurion to accept the UN Partition
Plan of November 1947, and motivated him to oppose
any Israeli attempt to conquer the West Bank during the
War of Independence of 1947-1949. Israel's other national
strategic interest was to finally demarcate Israel's borders
with all its neighbors in order to achieve both regional and
international legitimacy.
Parallel hereto, it was evident that the Palestinian people
wanted to implement their right to self-determination, establish
a state of their own, and end the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli Arabminority has repeatedly
expressed its interest to maintain Israeli citizenship, while
remaining a minority in a state that was led and shaped by
3 Ibid.
4 See Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan – The Life of King Hussein in War
and Peace; Allen Lane, Penguin, London 2007; chapter twenty
"Peace Partnership with the PLO", pp.422-439.
5 Compare with Henry Kissinger's remark: "A Palestinian state was
inherent in Prime Minister Menachem Begin's offer of Palestinian
autonomy at the first Camp David summit in 1978." In: Henry
Kissinger’s Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy
for the 21st Century; Simon and Schuster, New York 2002; p. 183.
its Jewish majority. For many years, the major political slogan
of the Israeli Arab communist party was: "two states for two
peoples". The establishment of good neighborly relations
between Israel and Palestine wouldmake it possible, so it was
hoped, to enable the Israeli Arab citizens to play a bridging role.
On the practical level, it was also obvious that the success of
Israel, as well as of Palestine depended on good neighborly
relations. The Palestinian and Israeli physical infrastructure
– water, energy, the road and railway network – are largely
if not completely dependent one on the other. Essential
economic interests also dovetail. If Israel wanted a successful
Palestinian state to emerge beside it, the Palestinian people
needed to rely on Israel. Israel was the most natural market
for Palestinian goods. If Israel wanted to connect to Jordan
and Egypt, the effective way was to cooperate with the
Palestinians in doing so. As a recipe for conflict resolution,
it was essential for the Jewish and Palestinian people to get
to know each other and to cooperate.
In order to lay the foundation for good neighborly relations
and close cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority, I wrote what became (without any change) Annex
III and IV of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles signed
on September 13, 1993. It provided for Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation in the fields of water, electricity, energy, finance,
transport and communications, trade, industry, labor relations,
the promotion of a Human Resources Development plan,
environmental protection, and coordination and cooperation
in the field of communication and media; it also provided for
a regionally supported Economic Development Program for
theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip, which was to include social
rehabilitation, small and medium business development,
infrastructure development, and more.
6
Whatever the conclusion may be from past developments,
the conceptual approach is today no less relevant, as it was
in 1993. Political and national separation between Israel and
the emerging state of Palestine has to be combined with a
comprehensive program of economic, social, cultural and
other cooperation that both sides need in order to establish
two prosperous and successful states. Seen in this context,
good neighborly relations are an essential common interest, as
is the need to pursue a process of social reconciliation in order
to overcome – gradually and slowly – the wounds of the past.
III. What Progress Has Been Made on the
Way to a Two-State Solution?
1. Moving from Opposition of all Parties Towards
Nominal Support of the Two-State Solution
a. The Historic Background for the Rejection of the
Two-State Concept
The British Peel-Commission was the first to introduce
the concept of a two-state solution already in the
summer of 1937. In November 1947, it was the United
6 See: The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, September 13, 1993.
