12
Developing an Israeli Grand Strategy toward
a Peaceful Two-State Solution
Arafat was not willing to establish a monopoly of
the use of force or a single command structure.
Instead, he played one armed group against the other
and provided each of them with a kind of financial
fief: one group was given the right to control the
income of the Karni passage of people and goods
between Israel and Gaza; another group was given
the right to control the income from the Allenby Bridge
passage, and other groups received income from
different trades. This system prevented a transparent
financial administration and a single state budget,
but depended upon different financial pots, which
Arafat controlled or permitted others to control, as
to control them.
Israeli Imposed Limitations
The Oslo II Agreement of September 25, 1995 established
the Palestinian Authority as a governmental structure
and provided the ground rules for the establishment of
the Palestinian Parliament, the Majlis. Hereby important
foundations for state building were created. This however,
went together with substantial limitations imposed mainly
by dividing the West Bank into area A, the cities, where
the Palestinian Authority obtained administrative and
security authorities; into area B, the villages, where the
Palestinian Authority obtained administrative but no (or
very little) security authorities, and the rest of the West
Bank (60% of the territory), where Israel maintained
administrative and security authorities. These provisions
had a damaging impact on the Palestinian capability of
state building, as explained below.
i. Diminished Administrative Capacities
The fact that the Palestinian Authority does not have
administrative control over 60 % of the West Bank
territory became a severe impediment for state
building:
It hinders planning for a road and railway network, a
sea and airport to serve the Palestinian people. Nor
can the Palestinian Authority build without Israeli
permission a functioning energy infrastructure: power
stations, an electricity network; the exploitation of
natural gas reserves and more. It also encumbers
planning and zoning necessary to permit urban and
rural areas to expand for additional housing and more.
ii. Limited Policing Capacities
In order to create a functioning, responsible and
prosperous State, the maintenance of law and order
is essential. The judicial system remains largely under
the control of the Palestinian political leadership.
Correctional facilities are wanting. Yet, most important,
the Palestinian police forces are seriously hampered
in executing their duties by provisions of the Oslo II
Agreement. There are few police stations in Area B,
and the pursuit of criminals from one area to the other
is dependent on a lengthy and tedious procedure
of coordination with the Israeli security authorities.
iii. Limited Economic Development Capacities
The expansion of Palestinian agriculture, of tourism
facilities, as well as possibilities for creating new urban
centers would be possible – theoretically – in area
C, which covers 60 % of the West Bank. Alas, under
present conditions these economic development
options are mostly undermined.
iv. Israeli Settlements Create Various Impediments for
Palestinian State-Building
The settlements have impeded Palestinian
development. However, an even greater impediment
to development has been the allocation of "state
land" to settlements and, at times, the expropriation
of private Palestinian land. The settlement leadership
has asserted strong political pressure on the Israeli
government to limit Palestinian access and movement
in order not to impede or endanger the movement
of settlers. Successive Israeli governments have
withheld important concessions for state building
to the Palestinians, in order to keep these measures
as a negotiating chip, particularly in order to gain
Palestinian concessions in regard to Israeli settlement
areas.
In addition, the Palestinian Authority has created
self-imposed impediments for development in order
to maintain the claim that the settlements are illegal
according to international law. This is actually not the
case, or would only be the case, if the Palestinian
Authority, announces the Oslo Accords as invalid.
In the various agreements signed under the Oslo
process, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority have
agreed that the responsibility and jurisdiction for the
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories remains
with Israel, and that the settlement issue has to be dealt
with in permanent status negotiations. This issue has a
major effect in regard to water. The Oslo Accords have
provided for the creation of a joint water committee
that coordinates all activities regarding water in the
occupied territories. Many projects for extending water
resources to the Palestinians have been vetoed by
the Palestinian representatives to that committee, in
order not to "legalize" water supply to the settlements.
A change of this policy would facilitate solving the
water problem, and enable substantial expansion of
Palestinian agricultural activities, tourism, and urban
development.
b. Improvement on theWay to Palestinian State-Building
Palestinian state building is undoubtedly a most important
national interest of the Palestinian people. It is a tedious,
lengthy and complicated process that is necessary to
turn a revolutionary movement, as the PLO was and
(possibly) still is, into an orderly state. Yet, the moment
the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza
was created, in spite of all the obstacles, the need for a
