13
state-building process, had gotten underway. And as a
matter of fact, in spite of setbacks,
important headway
has been achieved
.
Creating a Monopoly over the Use of Force, and a Single
Functioning Chain of Command
One of the first activities of Salam Fayyad, when he
became Prime Minister in 2007, was to regulate the
relationship between the Palestinian Ministry of Finance
and the various security apparatuses. He insisted on
a seemingly very simple change: all security officials
would receive their salaries directly into their personal
bank accounts from the Ministry of Finance. This move
largely (although not completely) eliminated the financial
power base of various Palestinian warlords, and hereby
in effect unified the Palestinian security forces.
General Keith Dayton, who was appointed US Security
Coordinator to work with the Palestinian Authority and
Israel, assisted President Abbas and his ministers of
interior, to create the various security branches, and
develop a clear and unified chain of command. A most
essential component for Palestinian state-building had
been accomplished.
Creating Conditions Supportive for Palestinian Economic
Development
The Economic Cooperation Foundation under my and
General Baruch Spiegel's leadership developed a concept
to overcome the anarchic situation that followed the second
intifada. The concept had four components: The first was
to reintegrate so-called fugitives – those individuals and
groups that had been members of security formations,
carried arms, and terrorized the local population by
demanding protective money for economic activities.
Fearing apprehension by Israeli security forces, these
fugitives violently opposed the changing and reformed
Palestinian security forces and thus became a major threat
to law and order. We suggested that fugitives who were
willing to give up their arms should be granted clemency
by the Israeli security forces, and the PA would arrest
them for several more months in order to keep them off
the streets for a transitional period, while offering their
families a minimal degree of social security. Both the
relevant Israeli and Palestinian authorities accepted this
concept, which enabled the Palestinian security forces
to disarm the fugitives and start to restore law and order.
This agreement prepared the way for further cooperation.
The second component was to remove roadblocks and
other impediments to movement and create a relatively
free flow of access and movement, mainly between Jenin
and Ramallah in the North of the West Bank, and between
Bethlehem and Hebron in the South. The passage via
Jerusalem has still remained problematic. The third
component was to foster the establishment of border
industrial parks, in the North in Jenin, in the South West
in Tarqumiyya and in the South-East, near Jericho. The
fourth and final component was to ease procedures at the
crossing points into Israel.
29
There remains the need to
expand Palestinian activities substantially into Area C, to
renegotiate the Paris Agreement of May 1994, governing
the Israel-PA economic relations; to renegotiate the
agreement in regard to water, and providing conditions
for Palestinian control of West Bank natural resources.
This – so far – has not happened.
Creating Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation
After the second intifada, the Israeli security forces still
viewed the Palestinian security forces that politically
identified with the Fatah movement, as potential enemies.
Yet, the coordinated Israeli-Palestinian effort to deal
effectively with the problem of the fugitives opened the
way to further security cooperation. The Israeli security
apparatus largely ignored serious efforts of General
James Jones, who was designated by Secretary of State
Condolezza Rice, to propose security conditions for a
Permanent Status Agreement, as those of General Keith
Dayton. Early in July 2008, General Jones complained
about this in a meeting with Gilead Sher (who had been
Barak's chief negotiator on the Palestinian file), with
Baruch Spiegel and myself. Gilead Sher arranged on the
spot a meeting between General Jones and Ehud Barak,
the Minister of Defense at the time. Several weeks later,
Barak and Israel's chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi travelled
to Washington. What followed was the emergence of a
US overseen Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.
General Ashkenazi would sum this up, with the simple
sentence: "When they (the Palestinian Authority) do more,
we do less". In spite of all the ups and downs in peace
negotiations, security cooperation has so far remained
intact. As such, it has become an important building
block for a two-state solution and the maintenance of
good neighborly relations between the two-states.
Salam Fayyad's State-Building Strategy
Another most important part of state-building was the
reforms introduced under the premiership of Salam
Fayyad to create functioning Palestinian state institutions.
The working of the various ministries was coordinated
and streamlined; a transparent state budget has been
created; some initial reforms of the judicial system have
been promoted. As important as this strategy was, it
disregarded two fault lines: In creating a functioning
state apparatus, Fayyad lost the confidence of President
Abbas, which eventually led to his dismissal and a slow-
down, if not a move away from his reform efforts. Second,
Fayyad's tendency was to act unilaterally and disregard
the need to seek a negotiated agreement on necessary
changes with the Government of Israel.
Remembering that the Israeli state-building effort, before
the proclamation of the State of Israel, lasted for twenty-
seven years, the Palestinian effort of state-building, partly
under more difficult conditions, is relatively impressive.
In conclusion: First, Palestinian state-building is a vital
29 See Hirschfeld op.cit. pp. 317-318.
