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established. The Arab States and the leadership of the
PLO demand in essence an Israeli up-front commitment to
accept an almost complete withdrawal to the June 4, 1967
cease-fire lines, the establishment of a Palestinian capital
in Jerusalem, and more than mere symbolic moves in order
to implement the Palestinian "right of return" of the refugees.
Whereas, more radical Palestinian groups, particularly the
Hamas, reject Israel's right of existence, while they might
be willing to accept some temporary compromise solutions.
The United States and Israel – among those who support
the concept of a two-state solution – envisage by and large
a gradual and phased process. During the fourteen years
that have passed since the publication of the Arab Peace
Initiative and the Bush approach to a two-state solution, this
gap was not narrowed, but rather widened.
Israeli past fears that a Palestinian state will become a
harbinger for Palestinian or Arabmilitary or terrorist aggression
against Israel have, due to the second intifada, Israel's
experience gained by withdrawing from South Lebanon, and
later from the Gaza Strip, and the more recent destabilization
in the Middle East, been reinforced. Ongoing Palestinian
terror acts, if even only committed by individuals, steadily
reinforce this fear. The common reality based knowledge in
Israel is that any peace agreement with Palestine will by no
means put an end to terror. ISIS, other jihadist movements,
Hezbollah, Hamas and last but not least Iran, who all publicly
committed to the destruction of the State of Israel, will try to
undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace.
Another Israeli nightmare, would be the emergence of
Palestine as a "failed state"; an eventuality that can hardly
be excluded. Destabilization in Palestine could all too easily
overspill to the East, and threaten the stability of Jordan; or
spill over to the West, and undermine security, law and order
in Israel, either by terror, or by criminal action.
As a two-state solution does serve Israel's national interest
to maintain its Jewish-democratic character and create
peaceful relations not only with the Palestinian people, but
similarly with other Arab and also Islamic states, cautious
headway in a phased controllable process appears to be
imperative. Israel's realistic policy choice is not between
signing and not signing a Permanent Status Agreement with
the Palestinian Authority, but either to engage in a phased
process on the way toward an agreeable two-state solution
or to try to pursue a policy of crisis management along the
lines of the present status quo.
On the other side, the Palestinians fear that any phased
process will leave them in the end with a truncated and
bifurcated Palestinian state, with limited sovereignty over
its own territory.
So far, the gap between these two positions has not been
bridged, largely due to the following reasons:
1.
The Destructive Repercussions of Double Asymmetry
The first asymmetry relates to the uneven Israel-Palestine
power relationship. Israel's military power, its economic
prosperity and income and its control of Palestinian affairs,
creates a very dangerous sense of Israeli superiority,
causing the Israeli side all too easily to over-estimate its
own negotiating position, and causing the Palestinian
side, to fear Israeli bullying.
This first asymmetry is being matched by a second
asymmetry, which makes the Palestinians believe that
geo-politics, demographics and time, are working in their
favor. It is being assumed that the Palestinian people
and leadership are and will be capable in the future of
mobilizing not only the Arab world but most the world’s
Islamic population. The geo-political situation makes it
evident that Israel cannot for decades to come remain
an isolated beleaguered island, armed to its teeth, in
the Middle East. Demographics clearly indicate that
Israel will not be able to maintain a Jewish majority by
maintaining the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
and time will enable the Palestinians sooner or later to
overcome Israel's qualitative (educational) edge and build
regional and global coalitions against the Jewish state.
The double asymmetry creates a dangerous dynamic. The
Israeli side is afraid of Palestinians switching repeatedly
from negotiations to violence. It is aware of the wider
regional support for the option of violence and armed
conflict, and is thus hesitant about making far-reaching
concessions and giving up strategic assets that would
be needed in conflict. Those on the Palestinian side,
aware of their power to withstand pressure, do not see
the need to settle for less than what they perceive to be
minimally fair.
2.
The Questionable Wisdom of Seeking "End of Conflict"
Sometimes politicians tend to create hurdles that are too
high to overcome. Many conflict resolution processes
have been relatively successful without demanding
the one or other side to commit to "end of conflict". The
peace process in Northern Ireland offers a clear example.
There, even agreement on the final end game has not
been achieved, but rather a commitment of both sides
to solve the ongoing conflict, by agreed procedural and
democratic means.
The need for Chairman Arafat to sign an "end of conflict"
agreement and "finality of claims", frightened him and
contributed to his remark that he would be assassinated if
he were to sign the proposed agreement. This is evenmore
evident for President Abbas. To commit to "end of conflict"
Abbas would have to satisfy the essential demands
of three different Palestinian groups: the Palestinian
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian
Diaspora and the Palestinian Arab citizens of the State of
Israel. To obtain the support of the West Bank and Gaza
Palestinians, any territorial concession is conceived as
failure; to obtain the support of the Palestinian Diaspora,
Abbas could not compromise on the "right of return"; and
in order to take care of the interests of the Palestinian
Arab citizens of the State of Israel, he could not accept
