11
There can be little doubt that the nominal commitment
of the most relevant actors to the concept of a peaceful
Israel-Palestine two-state solution indicated important
progress on the way toward a possible peaceful solution.
Nevertheless, the remaining gap of two contradictory
concepts, threatened to create obstacles on the way
towards implementation. The enabling conditions
suggested and demanded by the Palestinians and
the Arab states were: Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories, the establishment of the State of Palestine with
its capital in East Jerusalem, and agreed provisions for
the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their former
homes in Israel.
The American concept of a two-state solution shared
by Israel's center left wing parties was very different:
The enabling conditions were first and before anything
else, a common struggle against terror; the creation of a
peace-seeking Palestinian leadership, the establishment
of functioning state institutions, as a pre-condition towards
a phased approach on the way toward a two-state solution.
2. Achieving Headway on the Ground toward a Peaceful
Two-State Solution
a. The Political Obstacles to Palestinian State-Building
When Ben Gurion proclaimed the State of Israel on
May 14, 1948, the Yishuv (the Jewish community living
under British Mandatory Palestine) had built its state
institutions for almost three decades (mainly since 1921).
27
No similar development occurred in Palestine after the
conclusion of the Oslo I and Oslo II Agreements. The
causes of not doing so were mainly twofold: 1) Arafat's
self-serving political interests and leadership style; 2)
Israeli imposed limitations.
Arafat's Political Style
Arafat was a most remarkable leader. His leadership
remained (by and large) unchallenged until his death.
He achieved this without a government apparatus to
assert his authority, without a monopoly over the use
of violence, heading an umbrella organization – the
PLO – which combined several revolutionary groups,
each with its own leadership, its own para-military
organizations, its own grassroots support, and its own
largely independent financial income. To maintain an
unchallenged leadership under such circumstances
required a remarkable manipulative capacity. Arafat did
so by adopting several strategies:
i. Controlling three different Constitutional Structures:
After the signing of theOslo Accords, Arafat maintained
effectively three different constitutional structures:
those of the PLO, of Fatah and of the Palestinian
Authority. Additionally, he saw to it that decisions were
taken in his own court, outside those structures. Arafat
27 See Anita Shapira, Israel – A History; Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London 2012; Part II: A State in the Making; 1918-1948; pp.67-152.
allowed for elections to the Palestinian National Council
(the legislative branch of the PLO), for the Palestinian
Revolutionary Council (the legislative branch of Fatah)
and on January 20, 1996, he held elections for him to
become president, and for the Majlis – the Parliament
of the Palestinian Authority. However, he maintained
the right to nominate members and decisions were
continuously taken outside those structures, based
on offering revolving favors to changing actors.
Nevertheless, the three legislative bodies served an
important function: their elected members acted as
mediators and go-betweens between the Palestinian
people and the leadership.
ii. Controlling the Emerging Governmental Structure of
the Palestinian Authority:
After the Madrid Conference of 1991, the Palestinian
"inside" leadership of the West Bank and Gaza,
established the so-called "technical committees",
which in effect were state institutions in the making.
Experts under the political and organizational guidance
of Faisal Husseini and Sari Nusseibeh managed these
“committees” most professionally.
28
After the signing of
the "Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles" on the White
House Lawn, in September 1993, when negotiations
on establishing the Palestinian Authority got underway,
I was given the task to offer to transfer all (or most
of the) files of the Israeli Civil Administration in the
Occupied Territories to these technical committees, in
order to allow them to prepare effectively for emerging
governmental tasks. This offer that had the backing
of Prime Minister Rabin was rejected, as Arafat was
not willing to permit the technical committees under
the leadership of Faisal Husseini and Sari Nusseibeh
to gain governmental power.
iii. Arafat Maintained Financial Control
One of the jokes told to us in Norway referred to a
PLO official who wanted to fly from Rio de Janeiro to
Sao Paolo. In order to be permitted to buy the ticket,
he was ordered to come to Tunis, as he needed
Arafat's personal signature for the ticket purchase.
Financial control was linked to corruption in order to
create personal dependency upon Arafat, as well as
political vulnerability. A leading Palestinian diplomat
spent many hours with me, telling me in much detail,
how Arafat created financial dependencies, offering
at first presents to the Palestinian leaders of the
intifada, and to their families, and gradually creating
hereby a dependency relationship. Favors were
always measured and could be withdrawn at any
given moment.
iv. Maintaining a "Revolutionary" Structure of Armed
Groups
28 See Sari Nusseibeh (with Anthony David), Once Upon a Country
– A Palestinian Life; Halban, London 2007; chapter 23 "A Shadow
Government", pp.353-363.
