23
in March 2002. This continued until the election of Mahmoud
Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority in 2006. At
this stage, security coordination between Israel and the PA
completely fell apart, and the IDF began to engage in regular
incursions into Area A to take counterterrorism measures,
which (according to the Interim Agreements) were under
Palestinian security control. The fourth stage started in 2006.
Several factors may be noted as having led to a significant
reduction in the volume of terror and to a gradual increase
in the level of security coordination: the election of Abu
Mazen, who implemented a consistent policy of combating
violent resistance against Israel, and the struggle of the PA
and Fatah against the Hamas, which was perceived after
the elections in 2005 and the takeover of Gaza in 2006 as a
political threat to the PA headed by Mahmoud Abbas. This
marked the beginning of IDF and PA collaboration against
the Hamas, perceived by both as a common enemy. In
addition, a number of changes on the Israeli side resulted in
improved security and a significant decrease in the number
of terrorist attacks: the construction of the separation fence,
which hindered the crossing of terrorists into sovereign Israel
and enabled the IDF to implement a policy that differentiated
between civilian population and terrorist elements by means
of containment of the West Bank; a substantial improvement in
IDF intelligence capabilities; a reduction in the massive use of
tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as a reduction
in the implementation of policies involving clampdowns and
closures of Palestinian communities.
3
All these brought about
a gradual resumption of security coordination between the
IDF and Israel’s other security agencies (the ISA and the
police) and the Palestinian security forces.
Security coordination – Update
The security situation in the West Bank over the past decade
may be defined as stable but tense. In terms of casualties and
fatalities, there has been a dramatic decline in the number
of Israeli and Palestinian casualties when compared to the
Second Intifada in the early 2000s. According to ISA figures,
632 Israelis were killed in the five years of 2000-2005, and
143 Israelis were killed in the eight years of 2006-2013. The
figures for the Palestinians show that in 2000-2008 there were
4791 Palestinians fatalities (of whom 1793 were killed in the
West Bank), and in 2009-2015 there were 784 Palestinians
fatalities (of whom 238 were killed in the West Bank).
4
After
the Second Intifada several escalations occurred, mainly in
Gaza (Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, Operation Pillar of
Defense in 2011, and Operation Protective Edge in 2014), at
which time the security coordination between the IDF and the
ISA with the Palestinian security forces was not discontinued.
During these events, the Palestinian security forces served
3 Colonel Oren Avman, “The strategy of separation – The operative
index: The example of Northern Samaria, Maarchot, June 2006
4 The figures are from B’Tselem
-
of-event
to calm the situation and quelled extensive riots in the West
Bank. They also continued to maintain security coordination
even during events involving escalation that originated in
the West Bank, such as the abduction of the three boys and
Operation Brother’s Keeper in 2014, and the “Knife Intifada”
in 2016. At the same time, the Palestinian security forces
had to contend with Palestinian public opinion that opposed
security coordination, viewing it as a symbol of the humiliation
of Palestinian national dignity.
Security coordination apparatuses
Military coordination
– May 4 1994 saw the signing of
the Cairo Agreement. The security annex to the agreement
specified a procedure for the establishment and operation
of an Israeli-Palestinian security-coordination apparatus.
Subject to the agreement, apparatus headquarters were
established, involving a Joint Security Committee (JSC), a
Regional Security Committee (in the Gaza Strip), a Regional
Security Committee (RSC), and three District Coordination
Offices (DCO) – two in the Gaza Strip and a third in Jericho.
On September 28 1995, the Second Oslo Agreement was
signed in Washington, setting in motion the establishment of
seven additional regional coordination offices in districts of
the West Bank. This mechanism worked reasonably well until
Operation Defensive Shield in March 2003, serving as a buffer
that maintained regular communications between the security
bodies. Upon completion of the IDF operation, the IDF decided
to discontinue the security cooperation and dismantle the
coordination apparatus, whereas the Palestinians continued
to maintain their parallel apparatus mainly due to the need to
continue to pay salaries to their people. Resumption of security
cooperation began only after the Second Intifada ended,
and responsibility for it was transferred to the Coordinator
of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which
maintains a security coordination cell in each Coordination
and Liaison Administrations (CLA) in the different sectors
of the West Bank. Each CLA is under the command of an
officer with the rank of major, who works with the Palestinian
coordination apparatus, and a Palestinian National Security
Force (NSF) commander, who is responsible for the sector.
According to the agreements, Palestinian forces are responsible
for security in Area A (20% of the West Bank, mainly areas
that include Palestinian cities and towns and their environs).
Consequently, they may operate freely there, while the IDF may
not deploy forces in these areas. In Areas B (20% of the West
Bank), Palestinian forces are required to coordinate security in
advance, excluding a number of towns where Palestinian police
stations have been set up, where they may operate freely. Any
movement (in uniform and carrying arms) of Palestinian forces
in area C (60% of the West Bank) requires prior coordination
with the IDF. Starting with Operation Defensive Shield in March
2002, the IDF no longer upholds the Interim Agreement and
enters Area A to engage in counterterrorism measures. In
these cases, most of which occur at night, Palestinian forces
are informed in real time and (according to the agreement)
the IDF briefs the police stations in order to avoid friction
